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JOINDER AND SPLITTING OF CAUSES OF ACTION.*
By CHARLES E. CLARK t
T HE pleading rules concerning joinder and splitting of causes of
action are complements of each other, though designed to
achieve different objectives. The joinder rule is that separate causes
cannot be "joined" or pleaded in the same suit unless they fall within
one of the classes of permissible joinder specified in the codes. The
purpose of the rule is to prevent too wide a field of litigation and too
diverse issues in a single suit and thus to avoid a case of undue con-
fusion and complexity. The rule against splitting is that a single
cause shall not be "split" or divided among several suits. This is
designed to prevent litigation of the same question in different suits.
It therefore compels a certain extension of the issues in a single
suit on pain of forfeiting the opportunity to litigate them elsewhere.
Each rule is at least based upon reasons of common sense, though
applications of each may at times seem questionable. As the terms
in which they are stated indicate, their application in particular
cases will depend upon the meaning given to a term of frequent
use in the codes-the "cause of action", or group of operative facts
giving occasion for judicial action.1 The difficulties arising in ap-
plying the rules are due in the main to the fact that this term is of
indefinite content, and the courts have divergent views as to its exact
meaning as well as to the policy involved.
In the matter of joinder of actions generally, the tendency has
been continually to allow the plaintiff more opportunity to extend
the scope of a single suit. This has been achieved both by more
flexible statutory provisions, which affect not merely joinder of
*This article in substance will appear as a part of a chapter in a book
on Code Pleading, to be published by the West Publishing Company, St. Paul,
Minn.
tProfessor of Law, Yale University.
IThis concept has been discussed at some length by the writer in an
article, "The Code Cause of Action," 33 YALE L. J. 817 (x924). For a some-
what different approach, see 0. L. McCaskill, "Actions and Causes of Actions,"
34 ibid. 614 (1924), and criticism by the writer, 34 ibid. 879 (1925).
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causes but also joinder of parties,2 and by a more liberal definition of
code terms.
JOINDER OF CAUSES-HISTORICAL OUTLINE
At Common Law. Under the common law system of pleading
unity of the subject matter in a suit was secured by the writ sys-
tem and the forms of action. It is not entirely clear just what part
of this system furnished the yard stick by which the limitation of
subject matter was to be measured-whether the process, the form
of action, the plea or the judgment. The various somewhat con-
flicting rules have been well set forth by Professor Sunderland.3 In
general, however, the arbitrary limitations of the forms of action
necessarily operated to restrict the issues of a single action. Thus
various claims falling within the legal limits of a certain form of
action might be joined in different counts, even though based on
widely separated groups of facts; while claims redressed in different
forms of action could not be joined no matter how closely inter-
woven were the facts upon which they were based. 4 It resulted
that a kind of legal similarity of claim, rather than a unity of oc-
-See E. R. Sunderland, "Joinder of Actions," i8 MIcH. L. REv. 571; 32
YALx L. J. 384; 35 ibid. 85.
'Op. cit., note 2 supra. See also TIDD, PRAC. 9th ed., IX, I2; CHr"TY, Pi.
2o6; SHIPMAN, C. L. PL. (Ed. Ball.) 201, 203; KEIGWIN, CAS. EQ. PL. 430
et seq.; H. J. Howe, 14 ILL. L. Rgv. 58i; 2o CoL. L. REv. 712, 8oo (causes of
action in tort and in contract cannot be joined): cases collected, D~c. DiG.
AcTioNs, Sec. 39-4I; Cf. Sawyer v. Child, 83 Vt. 329, 75 Atl. 886 (trespass
and trover not joinable at common law); Newton's Admx. v. Am. Car.
Sprinkler Co. 87 Vt. 546, go At. 583 (so of trespass and case) ; Bull v.
Mathews, 2o R. I. 100, 37 Atl. 536 (so of trover and common counts in
assumpsit) ; O'Brien v. Moskol, 45 R. I. 486, 123 Atl. 5o8 (same) ; Dean v.
Cass, 73 Vt. 314, 5o Atl. io85 (so of claims on a false warranty in assumpsit
and in tort) ; Drury v. Merrill, 2o R. I. 2, 36 Atl. 835 (claims for breach of
promise of marriage and on a note are joinable) ; Lee v. Springer, 73 Vt. 183,
5o AtI. 8og, (several distinct assaults; joinable).
'There seem to have been two exceptions, based upon the historical origins
of the actions; debt and detinue, originally one action, could be joined, and
trover, which developed from case, might be joined with it. Cf. KEIGwIN AND
SHnIPMAN, cited supra; Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 212 Il. 134, 72 N. E. 200;
Ayer v. Bartlett, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) I56. Matter not joinable when made
the subject of an independent claim might sometimes be added in aggravation of
the damages; as in trespass to real property, where the taking of goods, a per-
sonal assault, seduction of the plaintiff's wife or daughter, injury to reputation
and even slander, might be alleged to increase the damages. Bracegirdle v.
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currence of the events relied upon, was achieved. No restriction
based upon the cause of action, or group of operative facts, was
used.5
it Equity. In equity we have a situation much more nearly
approaching that now existing in code pleading. Since in equity
the aim was to settle an entire controversy at one time, it was per-
missible to bring in all closely related matters. The rule was a broad
one, resting largely in the discretion of the court. It was stated,
both as to parties and subject matter, as a rule against "multifarious-
ness." A bill might be multifarious because of a joinder of an im-
proper number of either unrelated parties or unrelated issues or
both. In accordance with the rules of equity pleading in general,
these rules were not cast in definite and precise form. We do find,
however, statements indicating the later code rule as to parties,6
and also statements that all the issues considered should arise out of
the same transaction, or out of transactions connected with the same
subject matter.7 These phrases will be recognized as occurring in
the most famous of the code classes of joinder of causes."
Under the Code. It is not surprising to find the code rules to
a certain extent a combination of the common law and equity rules.
Attempts have been made to deduce extensive conclusions as to the
views of the codifiers not only on this subject but upon the entire
code, including the union of law and equity, from what they did
here.9 It would seem, however, that this is to read too conscious
Oxford, 2 M. & S. 77; Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473, 24 Sup. Ct. 505; Mer-
riman v. McCormick Co. 86 Wis. 142, 56 N. W. 743.
5Objection has been made to this statement. McCaskill, op. cit., note i,
supra; at pp. 623-6; cf. KEIOWIN, CAs. CODE PL. 235n. It is thought that its
point has been misunderstood. Of course the extent of the subject matter of
a single case was limited at common law; but it was done by the formulary
system; and the use of the cause of action as a unit of ineasurement is a device
of the code, developed largely from the equity procedure. See my article,
note I, supra.
"See STORY, EQ. PL. (870) Sec. 76c; Murray v. Hay, i Barb. Ch. 59;
Brinkerhoff v. Brown, 6 John. Ch. 139; Brown v. Guarantee Trust Co. 128
U. S. 403, 9 Sup. Ct. 125; 32 YALE L. J. 384; 33 Ibid. 817-82o.
7STORY, EQ. PL. Secs. 271, 272, 539; Bolles v. Bolles, 44 N. J. Eq. 385, 14
Atl. 593; Gaines v. Chew, 2 How. 619; KEIGWIN, CAS. EQ. PL,. ig8 et seq.,
CAS. CoDE PL. 439.
"Discussed hereinafter.9McCaskill, op. cit., note i, supra, at page 624 et seq. and see my criticism,
34 Yale L. J. 879.
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a purpose into their efforts. They apparently thought it necessary to
put some limitation upon the extent of a single suit; what more
natural than to work it out from what was known before? Yet the
forms of action were abolished. So in the original New York Code
of 1848 they stated classes of suits-seven in number-of similar
forms of claims, and provided that joinder might be had within
these classes.'0 The method is somewhat similar to that of the
common law, since similarity of legal claims seems particularly to
have been looked for. It is noteworthy, however, that they definitely
cut across the old common law forms. Thus, as pointed out in the
following section, the classes were in some respects less restricted
than at common law, and in others more so; the common law action
on the case for example allowing joinder of claims now appearing
in several of the code classes. It appears, however, that the joinder
thus permitted was not felt sufficient, for four years later in 1852
the famous provision was added, directly from the equity practice,
that there might be joined causes of action "arising out of the same
transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of the
action.""' This illogical combination of joinder classes, some based
upon similarity of legal claim and some upon unity of occurrence,
has persisted to the present time in most of the codes.
Modern Developments. Although the joinder classes of the code
were largely purely arbitrary, and not based on reasons of practical
convenlience, and although they have often been interpreted in such
manner as necessarily to force the bringing of separate suits,"
there has been less tendency to modify these provisions than in the
corresponding rules of joinder of parties. In fact there has been in
some places, notably in New York, a failure to realize the interrela-
tion of the two rules. The restriction on joinder of causes may be-
come applicable when the parties comprise only a single plaintiff
and a single defendant; but it also applies, and, when narrowly
construed, with startling results, when several plaintiffs or defendants
1°First Report, N. Y. 1848, Sec. 143; N. Y. Laws 1848, Ch. 379, Sec.
143. The classes are similar to the classes hereinafter stated (note 2o) except
that injuries to person or property by force and without force are divided into
separate classes and the same transaction class does not appear. The other
requirements of the modern codes as to parties and place of trial also appear
in the original code.
"2N. Y. L. 1852, 392, Sec. 167.
12See discussion in succeeding sections.
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or both are involved. It is held that the joinder of parties and the
joinder of causes requirements must both be satisfied, and hence an
extension of the former rule may largely fail of its purpose if "the
latter rule remains unchanged. 13 Hence the New York Board of
Statutory Consolidation, in recommending a new practice for New
York, included not only the English liberal rules of party joinder,
but also the almost complete freedom of joinder of causes permitted
in that system of practice. The legislature, however, failed to heed
the warning and adopted the former only.14 It would seem sensible
to hold that the attempted liberalization of party joinder should be
given effect, even if the former construction of the joinder of causes
section is thereby changed and extended, and such has been the de-
cision of some of the able lower court judges in New York."5 Un-
fortunately the court of appeals has indicated a view to the con-
trary. 6 The whole matter serves to emphasize the serious question
as to the desirability of continuing the old restrictions on joinder of
causes. A plaintiff may join a claim upon a judgment for money
damages with a claim for the proceeds of personal property convert-
ed and sold, both being considered claims upon contract; but he
cannot, under the New York view of the code, join a claim for dam-
ages for assault with a claim for damages for slanderous words
uttered in connection with the assault." Surely no reasons of prac-
tical policy justify such a distinction. On the other hand, it seems
wholly desirable that all the matters at issue between two parties or
1332 YALE L. J. 384, pointing out the difficulties to be expected under the
New York C. P. A.; 35 YALE L. J. 85 dealing with such a case; see note 16,
illfra.
'14Cf. N. Y. C. P. A. Sec. 258, with Report N. Y. Bd. St. Consol, I915,
v61. I, rules i8o, i8i. A short history of the rejection of the Board's report
and the substitution of the legislative Civil Practice Act is given in my article,
"History, Systems and Functions of Pleading," ii VA. L. Rev. 517, 540, 541,
5 Am. L. S. RXev. 716, 782, 9.
"5Sherlock v. Manwaren, 208 App. Div. 538, 203 N. Y. Supp. 7o9; 137
E. 66 St. v. Lawrence, i8 Misc. (N. Y.) 486, 194 N. Y. Supp. 762; S. L. &
Co. v. Bock, II8 Misc. (N. Y.) 776, 194 N. Y. Supp. 773. Cf. DeGroot v.
People's State Bk., 183 Wis. 594, 198 N. W. 6x4.
' 6Ader v. Blau, -41 N. Y. 7, 148 N. E. 771, 4x A. L. R. 1216, discussed
further below. It is criticised in 35 YALn L. J. 85 by the writer; 25 COL. L.




two sets of parties should be settled as shortly and speedily as pos-
sible. A provision that the trial court may order separate trials of
various issues where desirable would prevent undue complexity and
confusion of issues. Hence the English practice and that of a few
states providing for practically unlimited joinder of causes seems
highly desirable.' It may be considered one of the most immediate
steps to be taken in practice reform."
THE CODE PROVISIONS
The Codes. Except for the states noted below which have
abolished the restrictions on joinder of causes, the code states all
follow substantially the same course in making the joinder depen-
dent upon a fixed classification of the code. As previously noted,
the classes in general are arranged according to the nature of the
subject matter but the final class turns upon unity of occurrence of
the events constituting the various causes joined. The number of
classes differs in the various code states; being three in Colorado
and twelve in New York. The usual classes include the following
in some combination: (I) contracts express or implied; (2) In-
juries to the person; (3) injuries to the character; (4) injuries
to property; (5) actions to recover real property with or without
damages; (6) actions to recover chattels with or without damages;
(7) claims against a trustee by virtue of a contract or operation of
law; (8) actions arising out of the same transaction or transactions
connected with the same subject of action. Often certain of the
tort classes are found combined and in some codes the last class is
omitted.20
The purely arbitrary nature of the classes will be noted. All
'sSee notes 25, 27, infra.
19Certain other desirable modifications of subordinate requirements are
referred to below in connection with the discussion of such requirements.20The state statutes are as follows and all have seven classes, unless other-
wise noted: Alaska, Code 1913, See. 916; Arizona, R. S. 1913, Sec. 427, (only
such causes of action may be joined as are capable of the same character of
relief; actions ex contracti and actions ex delicto, actions to recover for in-
juries to the person, to property, or to character cannot be joined) ; Arkansas,
Dig. Stat. 1921, Sec. I076; California, C. C. P. 2923, See. 427 (eight classes) ;
Colorado, Code 1921, Sec. 96 (three); Connecticut, G. S. i918, Sec. 5636;
Idaho, Comp. St. igig, Sec. 6688; Indiana, Burns Ann. St. 1924, Sec. 286;
Kentucky, Carroll's Code i919, Sec. 83 (six); Minnesota, G. S. 1923, Sec.
9277; Missouri, R. S. igig, Sec. 1221; Montana, Rev. Code. 1921, Sec. 9130;
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forms of unrelated contract claims-express contracts, quasi con-
tracts and claims in judgments-may be joined;21 while unrelated
tort claims fall into three or more classes. Legal and equitable
claims may be joined by express provision 22 -claims calling for
different forms of trial and different forms of relief. And under
the last class tort and contract claims may be joined. Yet in some
respects the scheme is more restricted than the common law, for
under that system certain claims under classes (2), (3), and (4)
could have been joined as actions on the case. Professor Sunder-
land has noted some of the inconvenient and absurd results which
the code classification may produce.3 As he says, the final class
may upset every other distinction in the classification since it cuts
across all other classes. If causes may stand together at times under
class (7), what policy is there which would prevent them from
always doing so? Any possible inconvenience of trial is prevented
Nebraska, Ann. St. 1922, Sec. 86oi; Nevada, R. L. 1912, Sec. 5039; New
Mexico, Ann. St. 2915, Sec. 4105; New York, C. P. A. i92o, Sec. 258 (twelve);
North Carolina, Con. St. igig, Sec. 5o7; North Dakota, Comp. L. 1915, Sec.
7466; Ohio, Gen. Code 1921, Sec. II3O6 (nine); Oklahoma, Comp. St. 1922,
Sec. 266; Oregon, Code i92o, Sec. 94; South Carolina, C. C. P. 1922, Sec.
43o; South Dakota, Rev. Code 2919, Sec. 2371; Utah, Comp. L. 1917, Sec.
6567. Washington, Rem. & Bal. Code 1922, Sec. 296 (eight); Wyoming
Comp. St. 1920, Sec. 56o6. The same transaction clause appears in the statutes
of the following states only: California, added in 1907; New York; Ohio and
Washington (in the former it is divided into two classes, "transactions con-
nected with the same subject of action" forming a separate class; in the latter,
the second part being omitted entirely); Connecticut, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming (where injuries to person and
property are included in one class-a combination appearing also in the Col-
orado and Ohio statutes) ; and, formerly, before the adoption of broader rules
of joinder, Kansas and Wisconsin. For such broader provisions, found also
in Iowa, see notes 25, 26, below. In the California and Idaho statute a proviso,
added later, permits joinder or injuries to person and property growing out of
the "same tort," or "the occurrence or transaction"; also claims for malicious
arrest or prosecution with claims for injury to the character or person (the
latter provision occurring also in the Nevada statute). Several of the New
York classes deal with actions to recover penalties under particular laws.
The codes also contain requirements as to parties, place of trial and separate
statement which are noted below.
21Infra.
22See next paragraph of the text.
23J8 MICH. L. RZV. 571, 58o, pointing out, among others, cases which have
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by the discretionary power to order separate trials.24 As pointed
out hereinafter, however, some of the harsher results may be avoided
by a liberal definition of the terms used in class (8).
In Kansas, Wisconsin, and Ontario the restrictions have been
removed ;2r in Iowa and Michigan they are removed except for the
division of actions into legal and equitable ;2G in England and New
Jersey they are likewise removed except that actions for the recovery
of land cannot be joined with actions not relating to land.2T
Legal and Equitable Causes. Most of the codes provide that the
plaintiff may "unite" in the same complaint two or more causes of
action, "whether they are such as were formerly denominated legal
or equitable, or both," where falling in one of the permitted classes
held that claims to recover on different theories of the same wrong are not
joinable. See also KEmwlr, CAS. EQ. PL. 434, 5.
24As in Iowa, Code 1924, Sec. iog6i; Connecticut, G. S. 1918, Sec. 5636;
Missouri, R. S. 1919, Sec. 1221; or in New York, in reference to joinder of
parties, infra. Cf. 18 MIcH. L. Rev. 58o. In many states, severance is per-
mitted after demurrer sustained for misjoinder of causes. See note 1oi
below. See also Severance of Causes, below.
25Kansas, Rev. Stat. 1923, Sec. 6o-6or; (passed in 19o9) ; Wisconsin, Stat.
1921 Sec. 2647 (passed in 1915 from the Kansas statute; the plaintiff may unite
in the same complaint several causes of action, whether they be such as were
formerly denominated legal or equitable or both; subject to the usual require-
ments as to parties, place of trial and separate statement) : Ontario, I Jud. Act,
1915. Rule 69. See also U. S. Eq. Rules 1912, r. 26.
2GIowa, Code 1924, Sec. 1og6o (even where there is a misjoinder the cases
may be docketed separately with no further service on the parties; ibid, Sec.
io965) ; Michigan, Jud. Act. 1915, Sec. 12309; Holmes v. Borowski, 233 Mich.
407, 206 N. W. 374. The Iowa provision dates from the earliest codes, Code
1851, Sec. 1751, Code i86o, Sec. 2844.
27Eng. Jud. Act. 0. 18, rules I, 2; New Jersey, Jud. Act. 1915, r. 69. In
many common law jurisdictions the rules of joinder have been substantially
extended. See e. g. Florida, R. S. I9O6 Sec. 1389, allowing practically free
joinder; Alabama, Code 19o7, Sec. 5329 and Georgia, Code 1911, Sec. 5521,
authorizing joinder of all causes arising ex delicto, and all causes arising ex
contractu; Massachusetts, Rev. L. 1921, Ch. 231, allowing joinder within the
three divisions of actions; and Texas where without express permission, the
joinder is based on rules of discretion and convenience. Hudmon v. Foster, 231
S. W. 346, reversing (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) 210 S. W. 262, and see note 64 infra.
Under the civil lav in Louisiana, plaintiff may cumulate separate causes or
demands in the same action with certain exceptions and where not incon-
sistent. Louisiana Code Pr., Sec. 148-151; Learned v. Tex. & C. Ry. Co., 128
La. 430, 54 So. 931.
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of joinder. -8  The Connecticut provision goes further and states
that the plaintiff "may include in his complaint both legal and equit-
able rights and causes of action, and demand both legal and equitable
remedies; but where several causes of action are united in the same
complaint they must" fall within one of the specified classes.29 Hence
it is held under the codes that legal and equitable causes can be
joined. An example is the one given in the Connecticut rules, that
acclaim for legal relief upon a contract may be joined with a claim
for equitable relief upon an entirely unrelated contract.30 It has
been argued that these code provisions lead to the inference that
where both legal and equitable relief is claimed upon substantially
the same operative facts, there must necessarily be two causes of
action.3 ' But this is both an inconvenient usage and also one which
prevents the union of law and equity aimed at by the code. 32  The
better view is stated in many cases that one group of operative facts
gives rise to but a single cause of action upon which varying claims,
both legal and equitable, may be made.33
M'lfust Affect All Parties. The codes also provide that all the
causes joined must affect all the parties to the action. 34 The original
28N. Y. C. P. A. Sec. 258; N. Y. L., 1852, Ch. 392, Sec. 167 (where the
provigion first appeared). See, of the codes cited in notes 20, 25 supra, those
of Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Wisconsin, Wyoming. This does not apply in those jurisdictions where law and
equity are not united. Smith v. Waterloo & c. Ry. 191 Ia. 668, 182 N. W.
89o; Wellock v. Corvan, 221 Mich. 58, I9o N. W. 677; Metcalf v. Johnson,
15, Ky. 823, 152 S. W. 95i.
29Note 20, supra.
3°Conn. Prac. Bk. 1922, P. 282, Sec. 173; cases cited Dec. Dig. Actions,
Sec. 46; Cf. Benton v. Collins, 1I8 N. C. 196, 24 S. E. 322.
31McCaskill, op. cit. note i, at p. 632.
32See my articles cited in note i supra.
33Hahl v. Sugo, I69 N. Y. io9, 62 N. E. 135, discussed hereinafter. Lattin
v. McCarthy, 41 N. Y. io7; McMahon v. Plumb, 9o Conn. 281, 285, 96 Atl.
958, 96o; Am. Sav. &c. Ass'n. v. Burghardt, i9 Mont. 323, 48 Pac. 39I;
Whetstone v. Beloit Straw Board Co., 76 Wis. 613, 45 N. W. 535; West v.
Madansky, 8o Okla. I61, 194 Pac. 439; South Bend Chilled Plow Co. v. Geo.
C. Cribb Co., 305 Wis. 443, 8i N. W. 675. But see Kabrich v. State Ins. Co.,
48 Mo. App. 393. See other cases 34 YALn L. J. 884; Dec. Dig. Actions, Sec.
38 (2).
'Contained in all the codes except Arizona and now New York, notes
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New York code held that they must affect all parties equally.3 5 But
this has been changed so that the parties may be unequally affected.38
They must, however, be affected in the same capacity, so that a
cause affecting one as individual cannot be joined with another which
affects him only as an administrator, a cause affecting one jointly
with another cannot be joined with one affecting him singly, and so
on.3 7  This restriction cuts down the extent of permissible joinder
very materially since it requires identical parties to all the causes
joined.3 8 This is especially troublesome where the term cause of
action is given a narrow interpretation, limiting it to a single legal
claim, for it may even prevent the joinder of parties in the alterna-
tive.39 It amounts to another limitation on joinder of parties and
20, 25, 27 supra; Cf. notes 4r, 42 infra. In the U. S. Eq. Rules, 26 there is
an alternative provision to this requirement of parties, viz., "or sufficient
ground must appear for uniting the causes of action in order to promote the
convenient administration of justice."
'Code of 1848, note io, supra. The word "equally" was dropped in
1849. McCaskill, 34 YAu s L. J. 627 n.
38 Fegelson v. Niagara Insurance Co., 94 Minn. 486, io3 N. W. 495. All
parties need not be affected in the same manner and to the same extent. Fish
v. Chase, 114 Minn. 46o, I3r N. W. 631.
'Merrill v. Suffa, 42 Colo. i95, 93 Pac. io9g; Carrier v. Bernstein, io4
Ia. 572, 73 N. W. io76; Cinn. & Ry. Co. v. Chester, 57 Ind. 297; Lucas v.
N. Y. Cent. Ry. Co., 21 Barb. 245 (see note 42, iufro) ; Fischer v. Hintz, 145
Minn. i6I, 176 N. W. 177; Denman v. Richardson, 284 Fed. 592. This is
sometimes expressly provided in the statutes, as in Colorado and Iowa, notes
20, 26 supra, but the rule is adhered to generally.
'Hamilton v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., (Kan.) 297 Fed. 422; Brooks v.
Madden, 198 Ky., 167, 248 S. W. 5o3; Long Fork Ry. Co. v. Stumbo, 211
Ky., 46, 277 S. W. 297 (husband and wife); Calumet & Hecla Mining Co. v.
Equitable Trust Co., i86 App. Div. 330, 174 N. Y. Supp. 319 (cf. note 42,
infra); Shore v. Holt, 185 N. C. 312, 117 S. E. 165 (husband and wife);
Ryder v. Jefferson Hotel Co., 121 S. C. 72, 113 S. E. 474, 25 A. L. R. 739
(same); Weaver v. Kirby, 186 N. C. 387, ii9 S. E. 564; Runciman v. Brown,
223 Mich. 298, 193 N. W. 88o; Southern Surety Co. v. Patterson Steel
Co., III Okla. 39, 237 Pac. 588; Nahte v. Hansen, io6 Minn. 365, xig N. W. 55;
Belt v. St. Louis &c. Ry. (Mo. App.), 1go S. W. 1OO2; Hawarden v. Coal Co.
rII Wis. 545, 87 N. W. 472. See Dec. Dig. Actions Sec. 50. The effect of
this rule may be somewhat avoided by the assignment of several claims to the
plaintiff. Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 184 Pac. 477; Cullen v. Atchison
Co., (Mo. App. 1924) 268 S. W. 93; Benedict v. Guardian Trust Co., 58 App.
Div. 3o2, 68 N. Y. Supp. io82.
39Under this view, the claim against each defendant is considered a sep-
arate cause. See McCaskill, op. cit., note I, supra. In DeGroot v. People's
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would seem undesirable, for the party joinder rule should be a single
one complete in itself.4 0  Several codes provide that it shall not apply
to a mortgage foreclosure action,41 and the New York Civil Practice
Act, in adopting the English rule of party joinder, did go at least
to the extent of omitting this provision from the joinder of causes
section. 2
State Bank, 183 Wis., 594, ig8 N. W. 614, the alternative joinder statute was
held to override this provision. In Akley v. Kinnicutt, 238 N. Y. 466, 144
N. E. 682, claims of 193 plaintiffs for deceit by a single fraudulent stock pros-
pectus were held joinable under the present New York statutes; a liberal view
of cause of action would permit of their joinder under the old rules 34 YALg
L. J. 192, 195; but see Holland Oil & Gas Co., v. Holland, 114 Kan. 863, 220
Pac. io44; Rural Credit Subscribers Ass'n v. Hanger, 207 Ky. 303, 269 S. W.
342; Same v. Jett, 2o5 Ky. 6o4, 266 S. W. 240. Cf. Fairfield v. Southport Nat'l
Bk. 8o Conn. 92, 67, Atl. 471 with Warnock Uniform Co. v. Garifalas 224 N.
Y. 522, I2r N. E. 353. For cases giving a broad view of cause of action and
thus permitting the freer joinder of parties, see Capell v. Shuler, IO5, S. C. 75, 89
S. E. 813, (unlawful taking by one and detaining by others a single cause) ;
Am. Ry. Express Co. v. Hicks, i98 Ky., 549, 249 S. W. 342 (duress against
father and son). Fortmeyer v. National Biscuit Co., II6 Minn. I58, 133 N.
W. 461, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 569 (negligence against two persons not joint
tort feasors); Mayberry v. Northern Pac. R. Co., oo Minn. 79, xO N. W.
356, 1:21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 675, note (negligence against master and servant) ;
Barr v. Roderick, ii F. (2d) 984 (different grantees of fraudulent convey-
ances). So as to principals and sureties, Burns v. Van Buskirk, x63 Minn. 48
2o3 N. W. 6o8; Black Mt. R. Co. v. Ocean Acc. & G. Co., 172 N. C. 636, 9o S.
L. 763; but cf. Midland Terra Cotta Co. v. Shuster & Co., 163 Wis. 190, 157
N. W. 785. See also Juel v. Kundert, 46 S. D. 314, 192 N. W. 753; Robinson
v. Williams, i8g N. C. 256, 126 S. E. 621; Sawers Grain Co. v. Goodwin,
Ind. (1925), 146 N. E. 837.
4oCf. articles cited in note 13, supra.
4 1 See statutes of Connecticut, Kansas, North Carolina, North Dakota,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin, in note 20o supra. Cf. Leinback
v. Dyatt, 112 Kan. 782, 212 Pac. 894; Price v. Cent. Nat. Bk. io8 Okl. 2o8, .235
Pac. io88. In the Ohio and Wyoming and the former New York statutes,
the proviso is "except as otherwise provided (prescribed by law)". Other ex-
ceptions appear from time to time, as claim for damages to husband's per-
sonalty allowed with claim for wife's personal injury in California, note 20
supra; Farrar v. Whipple, 65 Cal. App. 123, 223 Pac. 8o; claims on successive
bonds of public officers, Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. State (Ind. 1925), 149
N. E. 377; or the broader provisions of the federal equity rules, note 25 supra;
Barr v. Roderick, ii F. (2d) 984.
42N. Y., C. P. A. Sec. 258. Cf. Akeley v. Kinnicutt, note 39 supra; Sher-
lock v. Manwaren, 2o8 App. Div. 538, 20o3 N. Y. Supp. 709; Forbes v. City
of Jamestown, 212 App. Div. 332, 2o9 N. Y. Supp. 99; Smith v. Earle, 202 App.
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Must Not Require Different Places of Trial. This requirement,
whether expressly stated or not, probably must apply so long as we
have "local" and "transitory" actions, that is, certain actions which
must be tried where the res is situated, and certain actions which
must be tried where jurisdiction over the parties is obtained.43 The
effect of the provision is therefore that the venue rules are not
changed by this section of the code.4 4 These rules are being gradually
limited in application and hence this restriction on joinder may be
expected to be of less and less importance. 43
Must Be Consistent. This requirement is found in a few codes
and has been read in by some other courts.4" A similar question
arises where several defenses are contained in a single answer . 4  The
requirement, wherever found, is an unfortunate one; for it affords
opportunity to the courts to require legally consistent claims and
thus operates harshly against a party who is honestly not sure of all
the facts or of the court's interpretation of the law in advance of
the trial.4" Thus recently the New York court of appeals, which
long since had achieved a reasonable definition of "inconsistent de-
fenses," held that a claim for the death of a child as due to the
negligence of a property owner in maintaining an iron fence was
inconsistent with a claim for such death as due to the malpractice
of the attending physician.4 9 True the claims were legally different,
Div. 305, 195 N. Y. Supp. 342; Fleitmann & Co. v. Colonial Finance Corp., 203,
App. Div. 827, 197 N. Y. Supp. x25; H. R. Medina, 21 CoL. L. REv. 113.
43For the codes, see notes 20, 25-27 supra.44Wilson v. Louisville Elec. Ry. Co. 33 Ky. L. R. 985, 112 S. W. 585;
Hackett v. Carter, 38 Wis. 394; Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235, III N. E.
837.
4'Cf. ScoTv, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE, Ch. 1; 34 YALE L. J. 56o.46Minnesota, New York, Louisiana, see notes 2o, supra. Seymour v.
Chicago & C. Ry. Co., 181 Ia. 218, 164 N. W. 352; Poland v. Chessler, 145
Md. 66, 125 AtI. 536. See cases cited infra, note 56. The provision first ap-
peared in New York in 1877.
471 ORE. L. REv. 26; IO CALIr. L. ReV. 25,; I MINN. L. REv. 94.
4s35 YALE L. J. 85. As to stating the same cause of action in different
counts, see discussion below.49Ader v. Blau, note I6, supra, with comments there cited in criticism of it.
Cf. Heaphy v. Eidlitz, 197 App. Div. 455, 189 N. Y. Supp. 431 where causes
were said to be inconsistent and hence to require a separate statement. See
also Edison Elec. Co. v. Kalbflaisch Co., 117 App. Div. 842, 1O2 N. Y. Supp.
lO39 criticised in 7 Cor,. L. REv. 625. But see France & Canada Steamship
Corp. v. Berwind, 229 N. Y. 89, 127 N. E. 893, IO A. L. R. 752. For the case
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but there is no reason why all the facts could not have happened as
alleged. No sound policy is apparent why such facts should not be
considered as a unit, and the case disposed of at one time. The dif-
ficulty is avoided by a definition of consistency-now almost uni-
versally applied in the case of several defenses-as requiring only
consistency of facts alleged, not of legal claims. It then becomes
a requirement of truth in the pleadings; and where it appears that
proof of all the facts alleged means perjury by somebody the plead-
ings are objectionable.50 This gives a limited but practical applica-
tion of the provision. It should be omitted, however, for the chance
of misconception which it gives, and since all its usefulness is covered
by the general requirement that pleadings must be true.51
Must Be Separately Stated. Each cause of action must be
separately stated and numbered." The practical interpretation of
cause of action in this connection is considered later.5 3
THE SEVERAL CLASSES
it General. Of the several classes stated in the codes, the only
ones of wide application are the contract class and the same transac-
tion class.54 These two classes also appear in substantially the same
form in connection with the pleading of counterclaims to the causes
set forth in the complaint.5 5 The limited application of the other
classes is apparent from their statement. In some states as in New
York the subdivisions are quite minute. 6 The class, however, pro-
of an election see Joannes Bros. Co. v. Lamborn 237 N. Y. 207, 142 N. E.
587; Seggerman Bros. v. Rosenberg Bros. 216 N. Y. Supp. 61 and discussion
below.
5oSeiter v. Bischoff, 63 Mo. App. 157; Canellos v. Zotalis, 145 Minn. 292,
177 N. W. 133; Turner v. Turner, 173 Cal. 782, 161 Pac. 980; Friedman v.
Rodstein, 176 N. Y. Supp. 554, 556 ; Burton v. Helton, (Mo., 1923) 257 S. W.
128; Eldridge v. Eldridge, (Tex., App. 1924) 259 S. W. 209; Eberbach v.
Woods, 232 Mich. 392, 205 N. W. '74.- For a somewhat different view of
inconsistency see McCaskill, 34 YALE L. J. 614, 640-643. Cf. 34 Ibid., 882n; 35
ibid., 90 note; 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 158 note.
5'See the writer's article, "The Complaint in Code Pleading" 35 YALE L.
J. 259, 277-8.
5'-Codes, notes 20, 24-27, supra.
nfra.
54Note 20, supra.
55Cf. N. Y. C. P. A. Sec. 266; Ohio, Gen. Code, 1926, Sec. 11317; Calif.
C. C. P. 1923, Sec. 438; 34 YALn L. J. 330; L. R. A. I916 C, 49r.
'For examples under the various codes, see Midler v. Noell, 193 Ky.
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viding for claims against a trustee-in some codes made to include
claims by or against any fiduciary-seems susceptible of wide ap-
plication where a trustee is involved.5*
The Contract Class. Causes arising out of "contracts, express or
implied" or "upon contract, express or implied" may be joined.58
This class has been given a consistently broad interpretation, as in-
cluding all manner of claims considered at common law in the con-
tract actions. Thus causes arising upon covenants, upon debts of
record or of contract, or of law, and upon express, implied and
quasi-contracts, including waiver of tort, may all be joined indis-
criminately. 9 The wide joinder here permitted with apparently
659, 237 S. W. 373 (different utterances of slander joinable) ; King v. Milner,
63 Colo. 405, 167 Pac. 957 (so of malicious prosecution and false imprison-
ment) ; Just v. Martin Bros. Co., 38 S. D. 470, 159 N. W. 44 (same and abuse
of process) ; Hanser v. Bieber, 271 Mo. 326, 197 S. W. 68; but see Greziani v.
Ernst, 169 Ky. 751, 185 S. W. 99 (libel and malicious prosecution not joinable) :
Weibush v. Jefferson Canal Co., 68 Mont. 586, 220 Pac. 99 (injuries to real and
personal property; joinder proper) ; Gomez v. Reed, 178 Cal. 759, 174 Pac. 658
(same) ; Irwin v. McElroy, 91 Ore. 232, 178 Pac. 791 (same) ; Weisshand v.
City of Petaluma, 37 Cal. App. 295, 174 Pac. 955 (injuries to person and prop-
erty joinable, see note 20 supra) ; but see Grey v. Thone, 196 Ia. 532, 194 N.
W. 961; Lennon v. City of Butte, 67 Mont. 101, 214 Pac. 11O1. In the absence
of the same transaction clause, claims in contract and in tort are not joinable,
Steinberg v. Trueblood, 124 Ark. 308, 186 S. W. 836; Miami Co. Bk. v. State,
61 Ind. App. 36o, 112 N. E. 40; Foy-Proctor Co. v. Marshall & Thorn, 169
Ky. 377, 183 S. W. 940.
'WThe more usual form is "Claims against a trustee by virtue of a contract
or by operation of law". It has been held that claims upon an express trust
and one arising by operation of law, may be joined, Burt v. Wilson, 28 Cal.
632 and so where all arise by operation of law, Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N. Y.
157, 61 N. E. 163 (against directors of a corporation); but not where one
arises by operation of fact, as for a wrongful conversion. French v. Salter,
17 Hun. 546.
58The former is the California, the latter the New York form. See note
20, s$tpra.
59Hawk v. Thorn, 54 Barb. 164; McCorkle v. Mallory. 30 Wash. 632, 71
Pac. 186; Rausch v. Arp. 39 Cal. App. 58o, 179 Pac. 694; Nicholas v. Hadlock,
(Mo. App. 1915) I8O S. W. 31; Bowler v. First Nat. Bank, 22 S. D. 71, 115 N.
W. 517; Walser v. Moran, 43 Nev. iii, i8o Pac. 492 reversing 173 Pac. 1149;
Bell v. Jovita Heights Co., 71 Wash. 7, 127 Pac. 289; Uecke v. Held, 144 Wis.
416, 129 N. W. 599; Dick v. Hyer, 94 Ohio St. 351, 114 N. E. 251; Sayles v.
Daniels Sales Agency, IOO Or. 37, 196 Pac. 465; Griffin v. Armsted, 143 N.
Y. Supp. 770, 147 Ib. 1114 (foreclosure of several chattel mortgages)'. It has
been held not to include the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage with a con-
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complete success casts doubt upon the policy of restriction applied
to tort claims to which the doctrine of waiver of tort was not ap-
plied.?0
The Same Transaction Class. This class has been the subject
of the most diverse interpretation by the courts. As we have seen,
it undoubtedly came from the equity rule.61 It is another example
of the practice of the codifiers in laying down a rule, obtained from
the discretionary practice of courts of equity, in seemingly definite
and precise form to prevent the exercise of wide discretionary powers
in the trial court?" The vagueness of meaning of the terms used,
however, results in as uncertain a rule in actual practice as one
which is frankly discretionary, but with the courts constantly at-
tempting to make a precise definition. The result is that a court.
having reached a definition which appeals to it, will demand finality
for the meaning which it has decided upon; but when a new situation
arises the application of this definition to it is just as much in doubt
as ever, until the court has spoken.6 3  A much sounder method of
interpretation would seem to be frankly to recognize the vague ex-
tent of the rule and to apply it broadly to carry out what all pro-cedural rules are designed to accomplish, namely, convenience and
tract claim. McCague Sav. Bk. v. Croft, 8o Neb. 7o2, 115 N. W. 315; City Real
Est. Co. v. King, 197 N. Y. 5o8, 9o N. E. 1157 aff'g 126 App. Div. 9ii, no N.
Y. Supp. i x24; or a claim for absolute divorce and a claim for separation,
Conrad v. Conrad, 124 App. Div. 780. 109 N. Y. Supp. 387. See cases collected,
Dec. Dig. Actions Sec. 45 (4).
COThe cases cited in the previous note indicate no confusion or incon-
venience in the waiver of tort cases. Cf. Sunderland and Keigwin, op. cit. n.
23, supra.
0t See discussion above and citations, n. 7 supra. The phrase included in
some of the codes with reference to this class "and not included within one of
the foregoing subdivisions of this section" has properly been construed not to be
a restriction on this class. Eagan v. N. Y. Transp. Co., 39 Misc. III, 78 N.
Y. Supp. 2o9; McInerney v. Main, 82 App. Div. 543, 8I N. Y. Supp. 539. Cf. N.
Y. C. P. A., Sec. 258: "Whether or not included within one or more of the
other subdivisions"--a preferable form of expression.
62Cf. 33 YALE L. J. 8.
03Thus in Stone v. Case, 34 Okla. 5, 124 Pac. 96o the court, having made
a somewhat limited definition of terms-which, however, worked in the case
at hand-concluded that from its opinion pleaders and courts could thereafter
determine when causes of action might be joined.
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efficiency in trials. This would result in much discretion in the trial
court.6
There are at least three different terms in the code provision, to
each of which a content must be given by the courts: (i) causes of
action arising out of (2) the same transaction, or transactions con-
nected with (3) the same subject of the action. The cases may be
classified in general as giving one of three interpretations. One is
to give a narrow legalistic meaning to all three terms; another is
to give such meaning to the first (cause of action), while giving a
broader, nontechnical or lay definition of the last two; while the third
is to give the latter interpretation to all three terms. Thus suppose
A to assault B, at the same time slandering him. At common law
the assault gives rise to an action of trespass; and the slander to an
action on the case.65 Under the first interpretation above, there
are different causes of action not arising out of the same transaction,
etc., and not joinable;66 under the second, different causes of ac-
tion joinable as arising out of the same transaction ;67 under the
third, a single cause of action.6 8  The New York courts in general
64See N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 17 N. Y. 529, 595 and see
the Texas cases, e. g. Buckholtz State Bk. v. Thallman, 116 S. W. 687, that
joinder should be had on grounds, of convenience, where it will not consume too
much time, confuse the jury or hinder proper administration of justice; Great
So. Co. v. Dolan, 239 S. W. 236; Lawrence v. Cananea Consol. Copper Co.
237 S. W. 959; Hudman v. roster, note 27 suipra.
6 5Cf. notes 2, 3, supra.
6 6Anderson v. Hill, 53 Barb. 245, 246; Dewolf v. Abraham, 15r N. Y. i86,
45 N. E. 455; Raspulo v. Ragona, 215 N. Y. Supp. 407; Keep v. Kaufman, 56
N. Y. 332; Green v. Davies, 182 N. Y. 499, 75 N. E. 536; Konick v.
Champneys, io8 Wash. 35, 183 Pac. 75. Cf. Adams v. Schwartz, 137 App.
Div. 230, 122 N. Y. Supp. 41 and the discussions as to counter claims, note 55,
supra. See also 36 YALs. L. J. 148.
6TDinges v. Riggs, 43 Neb. 71o, 62 N. W. 74; Harris v. Avery, 5 Kan.
146; Scarborough v. Smith, 18 Kan. 399; Craft Refrigerating Co. v. Quinnepiac
Brewing Co., 63 Conn. 551. See the Connecticut and New Jersey pro-
visions cited, note 71 infra. See also Lamming v. Galusha, 135 N. Y. 239, 31
N. E. io24; France & Canada Steamship Corp. v. Berwind-White Mining
Co. 229 N. Y. 89, 127 N. E. 893. Cf. Van Meter v. Goldfarb 317 Ill. 62o
148 N. E. 391 and Scott v. Waggoner, 48 Mont. 536, 39 Pa. 454, L. R. A. 1916
C. 491, with note.
6sHarris v. Avery, supra; Maisenbacker v. Concordia Soc'y. 71 Conn.
369, 376, 42 Atl. 67; Brewer v. Temple, 15 How. Prac. 286; Cf. Rosendale v.
Market Sq. Dry Goods Co. (Mo. App. 1919) 213 S. W. 169; Dixon v. City of
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follow the first interpretation-a view reinforced by a very late court
of appeals decision ;9 though at times they go so far as to construe
the term cause of action very broadly. Other jurisdictions vary be-
tween the second and third interpretation.7 0  The Connecticut and
New Jersey codes require at least the second by express provision
and do not prevent the third interpretation.,' So far as joining
causes is concerned, it usually makes little difference whether the
second or third interpretation is followed; the distinction becomes
important in connection with the separate statement hereinafter dis-
cussed -.7  The writer has always believed that the third interpreta-
tion is the sound one for the term "cause of action" whenever ap-
pearing in the code. This would give to it the meaning of a unit of
operative facts which may give rise to different legal claims.7 3
Under this view the three terms are not different in kind but in de-
Reno, 43 Nev. 413, 187 Pac. 3o8; and Beardsley v. Soper, i7i N. Y. Supp.
1043; also cases cited note 39 supra, notes 69, 77 infra.
69See cases note 66, supra. In the recent case of Ader v. Blau, note x6
supra, it was held that negligence of one defendant in maintaining a picket
fence resulting in the death of a child was not even the same transaction with
the negligence of the second defendant, a doctor, in treating the child. For
cases, however, giving a broad interpretation to cause of action see Cleveland
Cliffs Iron Works v. Keusch, 237 N. Y. 533, 569, 143 N. E. 731; Payne v.
N. Y. & S. Ry. Co. 2o N. Y. 436, 95 N. E. i9; Porter v. International Bridge
Co., 163 N. Y. 79, 57 N. E. 174; and other cases cited in this article. Cf.
note 68 supra.
7oCf. notes 67, 68 supra.
"1Conn. Prac. Bk. 1922, p. 282, Sec. 172. "Where several torts are com-
mitted simultaneously against the plaintiff, as a battery accompanied by slan-
derous words, they may be joined, as causes of action arising out of the same
transaction, notwithstanding they may belong to different classes of torts."
Ibid. p. 286, Sec. 187: "Transactions connected with the same subject of action
may include any transactions which grow out of the subject matter in regard
to which the controversy has arisen; as, for instance, the failure of a bailee
to use the goods bailed for the purpose agreed, and also an injury to them
by his fault or neglect; the breach of a covenant for quiet enjoyment by the
entry of the lessor, and also a trespass to goods, committed in the course of
entry". See also Sheen, N. J. Prac. Act. 1916, p. 222, Sec. 307, 222.
7-On tie separate statement, see below. The third view may be important,
however, where different parties are involved, to avoid the restriction that
causes to be joined must affect all parties; see note 39 supra.
.3See the writer's discussion in 33 YALr L. J. 817 and elsewhere in this
article.
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gree, each being a unit of facts but each one of broader content.74
The exact extent of each will depend not upon the chance or his-
torically accidental form in which our legal rights developed, but
in a lay or practical view of what is a unit in point of time or occur-
rence. This would seem in any event the only proper view of the
last two terms, the New York interpretation being wholly unjusti-
fied in view of their equity origin.7 5  There seem substantial rea-
sons for a like view of cause of action. They concern the use of
the terms as meaning a group of facts, with the emphasis of the code
upon pleading the facts, and are thought to reflect both the intent
of the codifiers and the most convenient usage. A more restricted
meaning makes the code concept a means of obstructing procedure
rather than of achieving a more simple and effective court machin-
ery.7 6
Some of the more suggestive cases are cited in the footnote.7 7
7 4There has been a constant attempt to define specifically and distinctly
all three phrases of the class. See for example the well known case of
McArthur v. Moffett, 143 Wis. 564, 128 N. W. 445, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.)
264, with comment, 9 MIcH. L. RZFv. 345, and Cf. McCaskill, 34 YALt L. J.
614, et seq. criticising the writer's view on the ground that it makes no sharp
distinction of kind but only one of degree between the phrases. Thus "sub-
ject of the action" is considered in McArthur v. Moffett to be the specific real
property involved; it is often thought of as meaning a specific physical thing,
or perhaps an aggregate of legal relations, such as a contract, or even a
"primary right". But in different cases it is held to mean all these things,
and in view of the equity origin of the rule, the use of the phrase in other
analogous connections, as in joinder of parties, and the convenience of its
usage, the attempt so to limit its content seems undesirable. Hence "subject
of the action" should also be given a non-technical definition, meaning in
general the subject matter of the action, permitting of wide joinder within the
limits of trial convenience. 33 YALE L. J. 832 n.; KtIGwIN, CAS. CoDE P,. 441,
2; Conn. Prac. Bk. 1922, p. 286, Sec. 187, quoted note 71, supra.
"Professor McCaskill although arguing for a limited legal view of
cause of action, agrees with the lay view of the other phrases. Op. cit. note
74 supra. For a liberal interpretation of "transaction" by the United States
Supreme Court with reference to counterclaims, see Moore v. N. Y. Cotton
Exch. 46 Sup. Ct. 367 (1926). This court has in general taken a broad view
of "cause of action". Chicago, etc. Ry. v. Schendel, 46 Sup. Ct. 42o (x926);
Mo. etc. Ry. v. Wulf, 226 U. S. 570, 33 Sup. Ct. 135.
7633 YAI L. J. 817; 34 Ibid. 879.
77 The cases, while not falling into clear cut classes and being conflicting
even in the same jurisdiction, in general take one of two positions, the first
that of a grouping according to the occurrence of the events involved, a
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THE SEPARATE STATEMENT
When Required. Each cause of action must be separately stated
and numbered.7 8  It should be preceded by a heading such as "First
Cause of Action," "First Count," etc. The allegations of each cause
should then be paragraphed. 0 The allegations of one cause cannot
be used to help out the allegations of another cause in the same
complaint,"' unless incorporated into such other cause by express
and definite reference.$'
The requirement of separate statement is a natural and reasonable
one designed to keep the issues clear and simple. When the code
ideal of stating the facts is kept in mind, and the cause of action is
grouping of fact; the second, a grouping according to the legal claims involved.
The first is the one here favored. See, for example, Boulden v. Thompson, 21
Cal. App. 279, 131 Pac. 765; Worth v. Dunn, 98 Conn. 5I, II8 At. 467;
Tsuboi v. Cohn, 40 Idaho 102, 231 Pac. 7o8; Burton v. Collins, 118 N. C.
i96, 24 S. E. i22; Lee v. Thornton, 171 N. C. 209, 88 S. E. 232; Stark County
v. Mischel, 33 N. D. 432, i56 N. XV. 931; State v. P. Lorillard Co. i8I Wis.
347, 193 N. AV. 613; but cf. N. C. Land Co. v. Beatty, 69 N. C. 329. Claims
for common law and statutory negligence, including claims under the federal
Employes Liability Act and state Workmen's Compensation Acts are usually
held to state but one cause of action. Chicago etc. Ry. v. Schendel and Mo.
etc. Ry. v. Wulf, supra note 75, Payne v. N. Y. S. W. Ry., supra note 69;
Chrosciel v. N. Y. Cent. Ry. 159 N. Y. Supp. 294, 174 App. Div. 175; Doyle
v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 134 Minn. 461, i59 N. W. io8r; Hutton v. Link
Oil Co. io8 Kan. x97, 194 Pac. 925; Ford v. Powell (Mo. App.) 243 S. W.
366. But see First Const. Co. v. Rapid Transit Co., 122 Misc. 145, 203 N. Y.
Supp. 359; St. Louis & San Francisco Co. v. Boridreaux, 159 Ark. 684, 252 S.
W. 913 and IO MIn,. L. REv. 417, 424 criticising-unjustifiably, it is thought,-
Edelbrock v. Minn. Ry. Co. 166 Minn. i, 2o6 N. W. 945. In general see
cases Dec. Dig. P1. Sec. 48; THRocKMoRroN's CAS. CODE PL. 308.78 See codes notes 20, 25, 26, supra. In New York the provision now
appears in C. P. A. rule go.
79See N. C. A. P. A. rule 90; Conn. G. S. i918, Sec. 5637; N. C. Consol.
St. gig, Sec. 5o6; N. J. Prac. Act. i912, r. I7, 36. The practice of numbering
the paragraphs is usually approved. Burton v. Doyle, 48 Okl. 755, i5o Pac.
71. Contra, Kerr v. City of Bellefontaine, 59 Ohio St. 446, 52 N. E. io24.
8 0Gertler v. Linscott, 26 Minn. 82, I N. W. 579; Liebster v. Friedman,
i8o N. Y. Supp. 322; Ross v. Chicago etc. Ry. 225 Ill. App. 633; McDonald
v. Hall, 193 Mich. 5o, 159 N. W. 358.
8 'Curtis v. Moore, 15 Wis. 134; Schrade v. Camillus Cutlery Co. 242 Fed.
523; James Rees & Sons Co. v. Angel, 125 Misc. (N. Y.) 771, 211 N. Y. Supp.
817; Dec. Dig. Pl. Sec. 54. The practice of incorporating by reference, while
generally favored, is not permitted in a few states. Cf. Murray v. City of
Butte, 35 Mont. 161, 88 Pac. 789.
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treated as a convenient unit of such facts, the provision works well.
It is somewhat analogous to the division of a book into chapters, the
size of the chapters depending largely on convenience in trial. This
is the form of definition above suggested and followed in many
cases.8 2  Even in New York it has been often followed, and was
followed recently in a case where claims for demurrage against vari-
ous shippers under different contracts but in the same vessel were
held to arise out of the same cause of action.8 No advantage is se-
cured by the separate statement unless the facts are substantially
different, as for example, in the case of two distinct and unrelated
contracts. 4  On the other hand to hold that there is a new cause
every time a different legal interpretation is put or legal claim is
made on substantially the same set of operative facts is to compel
a useless and confusing repetition of the same allegations in order
to make a slightly different claim of law thereon. 5  This is to go
back to the count practice of the common law, which was designed
to meet another difficulty, as noted in the next paragraph, and
which has been so generally and justly criticized. Once again ex-
ception may be taken to a definition of cause of action which ob-
structs rather than helps."'
82See cases and authorities cited in the preceding section of this article.
83Cleveland Cliffs Iron Works v. Keusch, 237 N. Y. 533, 569, 143 N. E.
731; 126 Court of Appeals Records I; 33 YALt L. J. 817. Other striking exam-
ples are the union of legal and equitable claims in a single cause, HahI v.
Sugo, note 33, supra; different legal claims on a single cause as in Payne v. N.
Y. & S. R. R. Co. notes 69, 77 supra; and, as in the Cleveland Cliffs case, a
single cause affecting several parties, n. 39 supra.84Separate contracts; see Upson Co. v. Erie R. Co. 213 App. Div. 262,
21o N. Y. Supp. 1I2; Royle v. McLaughlin, 195 App. Div. 413, 186 N. Y. Supp.
356; Gaddis v. Williams, 81 Okl. 289, 198 Pac. 483; and note 138 infra.
8Akley v. Kinnicutt, note 39 su pra, where the pleader felt compelled to
set up 193 causes shows the inconvenience of the practice; of the eighteen
paragraphs of the complaint, fourteen were incorporated by reference into
each count except the first, and two others were substantially identical; the
complaint comprised iogo folios covering 364 pages of the printed record. 34
YALE L. J. 195. See also the next paragraph of the text and notes 89-91
below.
86See the writer's articles, cited note i, supra. See cases cited above in
this article, and see the series of Stoneham cases, 2o6 N. Y. Supp. 9oo, 913,
956; 207 N. X. Supp. 938; Packard v. Fox Film Corp. 207 App. Div. 311.
2o2 N. Y. Supp. 164; Rich v. Fry, 196 Ind. 303, 146 N. E. 393. Thus in
Missouri the holding in McHugh v. St. Louis Transit Co. igo Mo. 85, 88 S.
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Stating the Same Cause in Different Counts. At common law
it was forbidden to make allegations of fact in the alternative.8 7
In order to meet the difficulty thus created, since often the pleader
could not tell in advance of trial just how the evidence would develop,
and in order further to meet varying theories of law upon the case
as it might appear to the court, the practice of using plural counts
to state the same case arose.8 This led to much repetitious state-
ment in the cases and was severely condemned by the English Com-
mon Law Commissioners 9 and the New York Code Commissioners.
The latter said that thus "the pleadings came to be that mass of
verbiage which they now are." 0  So under the code, where emphasis
is placed upon pleading merely the facts, the use of several counts
to state the same cause was strongly disapproved. 1 With the pro-
vision of the code that variances should be disregarded unless they
have misled the opponent, there was less need of the practice, and
this would be yet more true in jurisdictions allowing pleading in
the alternative.92 Yet as Judge Keigwin points out, the pleader
may often still desire to plead his case according to two different legal
theories. 3 It might be possible to do this in a single count and yet
W. 853 (that claims for injury for common law negligence and breach of
city ordinance constitute two causes) has been overruled. White v. St. Louis
etc. Ry. 2o2 Mo. 539, 101 S. W. 14; cases cited, 33 YALE L. J. 830 n., note 77,
supra.
87Hankin, "Alternative and Hypothetical Pleading", 33 YALE L. J. 365;
Clark, 35 YALE L. 3. 259, 278, 9.
s"CHITTY. PL. x6 ed. 4o8-418; SHIPMAN, C. L. PL. (Ed. Ball.) 2o3-2o6;
KEIGWIIN, CAS. C. L. PL. 53I et. seq. giving many cases. Cf. Miller v. South-
ern Ry. 21 Ga. App. 367, 94 S. E. 61g.
89In reporting the Hilary rules (1834); STEPHEN. PL. (Ed. Will.)
*LXXXII-*LXXXVI; they said that the practice "often leads to such bulky
and intricate combinations of statements as to present the case to the judge
and jury in a form of considerable complexity; and it is apt, therefore, to
embarass and protract the trial, and occasionally leads to ultimate confusion
and mistake in the administration of justice."
9OFirst Report, 139.
91Baxter v. Camp. 71 Conn. 245, 41 Atl. 803 per Baldwin J. and Nash v.
McCauley, 9 Abb. Pr. 159 citing cases; and other Connecticut and New York
cases cited in 33 YALE L. J. 833 n. 836 n.; Coleman v. St. Paul etc. Co. IiO
Wash. 259, 188 Pac. 532; Lund v. Salt Lake Co. 58 Utah 546. 200 Pac. 510.
Hankin, op. cit. note 87, supra, at page 268.
9 2 See authorities in note 87, supra.
9 3KEIGWIN, CASES CODE PL. 514, 515.
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often it seems clearer to state it separately in two counts. An ad-
ditional reason for so doing is that a judge, who takes the restricted
view of the concept cause of action, may think he has stated two
causes anyhow and require a separate statement.94 In any event it
proved impracticable and harsh to do away with the common law
practice and hence generally under the code it is still permitted.9:
This seems the sounder practice. The objection, if any, should not
be to the use of plural counts as such, but to undue verbosity and
repetition which should be ordered corrected where really neces-
sary for the clarity of the pleadings." But where no harm is done
and the pleader's meaning is clear, it is shorter and simpler not to
stop to order changes to secure some possibly more perfect plead-
ing. Particularly is this so when the pleader has more completely
disclosed his case by such manner of allegation. It should be noted
that a strict interpretation of the rule of "consistency" considered
above may lead to injustice which is avoided under the common
law practice here discussed.9 7
OBJECTIONS TO IMPROPER JOINDER
Method of Raising Objection. Under the formulary system
of the common law, improper joinder of actions was necessarily a
94See e. g. Ist Const. Co. v. Rapid Transit Co. 122 Misc. 145, 2o3 N. Y.
Supp. 359; Brown v. Thompson-Starrett Co. 139 App. Div. 632, 124 N. Y.
Supp. 396; Crosby v. Otis Elevator Co., 141 App. Div. 369, 126 N. Y. Supp.
2o4 (Laughlin, J., dis.).
95Astin v. Chicago etc. Ry. 143 Wis. 477, 128 N. W. 265, 31 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 158, with note; Raymond v. Bailey, p8 Conn. 2oI, I18 Atl. 915; Worth
v. Dunn, 98 Conn. 5I, 118 At. -467; Russell v. John Clemens & Co. 196 Ia. 1121,
195 N. W. loo9; Carter Oil Co. v. Garr, 731 Oki. 28, 174 Pac. 498; Williams
v. Nelson, 45 Utah, 255, 145 Pac. 39; Staples v. Esary, 130 Wash.
521, 228 Pac. 514; Dec. Dig. Pl. Sec. 53; THROCKMORTON, CAS. CODE PL. 242.
Some cases suggest that the plaintiff should be required to elect between the
counts at the trial, Manders v. Craft, 3 Colo. App. 236, 32 Pac. 836; Harvey
v. S. P. Co. 46 Ore. 5o5, 8o Pac. io6i; but this in large measure nullifies the
benefits of the practice; the correct procedure is given in Raymond v. Bailey,
supra, where both counts are allowed to go to the jury, under instructions
that, in any event, recovery may be had on only one.
""The matter is largely one of discretion, Blankenship v. Decker, 34 Mont.
292, 85 Pac. 1035; cf. note 85, supra; N. Y. C. P. A., rule 1O3.
97Cf. Heaphy v. Eidlitz, n. 49, supra, requiring separate statement of in-
consistent claims: Roxana Co. v. Covington Bk. 98 Okla. 266, 225 Pac. 375.
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fatal defect, of which advantage could be taken even after verdict.9 8
Under the code however, the objection is to be made by demurrer
which should specify the ground upon which it is based. 9 It will
lie although the causes have been mingled together in one count.100
In some jurisdictions the remedy is merely an order of severance;
perhaps that the plaintiff strike out one cause or elect upon which
to stand. The order for separate trials seems the most simple and
convenient remedy.''
By some decisions the pleader has been forced to elect at the
trial the count upon which he will proceed." 2 Under our modern
views as to joinder generally, and under the requirements that this
ground must be specified in a demurrer and that all formal objec-
tions not taken in proper course are waived,0 3 this seems an incor-
rect view. Unless the defendant raises the objection seasonably by
9SSunderland, op. cit. note 2, supra; Bull v. Mathews, note 2, sz,pra;
Dean v. Cass, note 2, supra.
99See the code provisions on the demurrer, SUND.RIAND'S CAS. CODE PL.
543-546. Where the demurrer is abolished, as in New York, the objection is
by motion; N. Y. C. P. A., Sec. 277, 278; where this objection does not appear
on the face of the pleading, it seems it may be taken by answer, Ibid. cf.
Coppola, v. Di Benedetto, 127 Misc. 276, 215 N. Y. Supp. 722. It has
been held, however, that there is a misjoinder unless the complaint shows on
its face that there may be a joinder. Flynn v. Bailey, 5o Barb. 73. For the
numerous cases holding the demurrer the proper remedy, see Dec. Dig. P1.
Sec. 193 (6).
'o0Wiles v. Suydam, 64 N. Y. 173; Faesi v. Goetz, 15 Wis. 231; Conti-
nental Securities Co. v. Yuma Nat. Bk. 2o Ariz. 13, 176 Pac. 572; Dewing v.
Dewing, 112 Minn. 316, 318, 127 N. W. 2O52; Fischer v. Hintz, 145 Minn.
16I, 176 N. W. 177.
lolSunderland, op. cit. note i, supra, citing statutes. See especially Eng.
Jud. Act. Order 16, r. i; Order 18 r. 8; Iowa, Code 1924, Sec. 2O962, 1o963
(motion to strike is the only remedy; where granted the separate causes may
be docketed without further service) ; Kansas, Mathes v. Shaw, 85 Kan. 162,
116 Pac. -44; Kentucky, Carroll's Code, 1919, Sec. 85; North Carolina, Consol.
St. 2929, Sec. 507 (if demurrer is sustained for misjoinder, the court may
order the division of the action); and Michigan and New Jersey; for the
power to order separate trials, see note 24 supra.
1o2See cases in notes 95 supra; McHugh v. St. Louis Transit Co. note 86,
supra; Dec. Dig. P1. Sec. 369.
'10See the general code provision, that all objections not taken by demurrer
or answer are waived except lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause
of action. N. Y. C. C. P. (919) Sec. 499; Hinton's Cas. Code P1., 2d ed.
432.
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demurrer, specifying the reason, he should be deemed to have waived
it.104
Where one of the two causes which the pleader has attempted
to state is defective and states no cause, there is some question
whether the objection of misjoinder can be raised. 5 It would seem
simpler, in accordance with the more usual view, to treat the defec-
tively stated cause as non-existent and merely reject its allegations
as surplusage.'0 6
Same-Failure to State Separately. Failure to make the separate
statement of each cause as required is a defect of form, waived if
not seasonably taken. The remedy should be only by motion to
compel a separate statement. 0 7 In some jurisdictions the special
demurrer may be employed for such defects of form. 0 8 It is per-
haps unfortunate that courts often tend to treat this as an important
issue, reversing the decision of the trial court. A liberal and flexible
view of the cause of action would permit of much discretion in the
trial court on this matter and might well be used to prevent a litigant
from wasting the time of appellate courts on such comparatively
trivial issues. 0 9
SPLITTING A CAUSE or ACTION
Purpose of the Rule. The rule against splitting a cause of ac-
tion is well stated in a leading case as follows: "The principle is
settled beyond dispute that a judgment concludes the rights of parties
in respect of the cause of action stated in the pleadings on which
lO4So expressly specified in many codes, N. Y. C. P. A. Sec. 278; Iowa,
Code 1924, Sec. io964; Ky. Corroll's code 1919, Sec. 85 and generally held;
cases cited Dec. Dig. P1. Sec. 406 (8).
losThat there is no misjoinder in such case, see Hiles v. Johnson, 67 Wis.
517, 3o N. W. 721; Konick v. Champneys, io8 Wash. 35, 183 Pac. 75; Flint
v. Hubbard, i6 Colo. App. 464, 66 Pac. 446; Tew v. Wolfshon, 176 N. Y.
272, 66 N. E. 934; Judin v. Samuel, i. B. & P. N. R. 43, 127 Reprint, 374.
Contra, Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235, ii N. E. 837.
106Cases cited, note l05, supra; i C. J. lO62 n.07Bass v. Comstock, 38 N. Y. 21; Darknell v. Coeur d'Alene & St. Joe
Transp. Co., 18 Idaho 61, io8 Pac. 536; Grimes v. Greenblatt, 47 Colo. 495,
107 Pac. InIi; Dec. Dig. P1. Sec. 368.
lOsCf. Childs v. Bank of Missouri, 17 Mo. 213, for the older rule in New
York see Durkee v. Saratoga etc. Ry. 4 How. Pr. 226.
'09Cf. notes 95, 96 supra; 33 YALt L. J. 836. In the New York cases the
matter is often carried through the various appellate courts, to the court of
appeals; see cases in notes 83, 85, 86 supra.
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it is rendered, whether the suit embraced the whole or only part of
the demand constituting the cause of action. It results from this
principle, and the rule is fully established, that an entire claim, aris-
ing either upon a contract or from a wrong, cannot be divided and
made the subject of several suits; and if several suits be brought
for different parts of such a claim, the pendency of the first may
be pleaded in abatement of the others, and a judgment upon the
merits in either will be available as a bar in the other suits. But it
is entire claims only which cannot be divided within this rule, those
which are single and indivisible in their nature. The cause of ac-
tion in the different suits must be the same. The rule does not pre-
vent, nor is there any principle which precludes, the prosecution of
several actions upon several causes of action. * * * * It makes no
difference that the causes of action might be united in a single suit;
the right of the party in whose favor they exist to separate suits is
not affected by that circumstance, except that in proper cases, for
the prevention of vexation and oppression, the court will enforce
a consolidation of the actions." 110
The rule against splitting is therefore but a part of the theory
of res judicata, and is obviously based on sound policy to prevent
the harassing of defendants and the wasting of the time of courts.
The expression "splitting a cause of action" is metaphorical; what
is meant is that within the limits of application of the rule the
plaintiff cannot litigate in one suit a right or rights which he either
did bring up or could have brought up in a suit commenced earlier.
But since the test--especially under the code where all forms of
rights may be litigated in a single action-centers about the cause of
action or unit group of operative facts, the express phrasing of the
rule is not undesirable. 1'
Effect of the Code upon the Rule. It has been urged that under
the code, due to a liberal interpretation of the concept cause of action,
a wide application of the rule against splitting, one unknown to the
1"oSecor v. Sturgis, i6 N. Y. 548.
"33 YAL L. J. 836; 33 Ibid. 326; 32 Ibid. 190; 34 Ibid. 677, 883-4. The
objection that a cause is split can only be made in the second suit; it is no
objection to the first suit. Martin v. Howe, igo Cal. 187, =11 Pac. 453; Md.
Cas. Co. v. Cherryvale Gas. Lt. Co. 99 Kan. 563, 162 Pac. 313; Genl. Elec.
Engineering Co. v. Brumon, 218 Mich. 571, i88 N. W. 5oo.
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common law and of harsh effect, is made.112  But the rule existed
at common law and must exist under any law which at length sets
an end to judicial disputes between litigants."1 3 The apparently
wider application of the rule under the codes is due to two reasons.
The first is that various remedies may now be secured in a single
action and hence a litigant no longer need or can bring successive
suits to find the remedy which should apply to his wrong. Thus
at common law a litigant who brought trespass when he should have
brought case is not thereby precluded from starting an action of
case; whereas under the code there would be no occasion for such
a rule. But the difference is more apparent than real here, for a
matter once really litigated in a common law action could not be
relitigated in other actions." 4  The second reason is that there is
probably a tendency constantly to extend the limits of what is con-
sidered a "single, entire claim." This is due to a number of causes,
including the greater scope of permissible remedies in the code ac-
tion, the general extension of rules of joinder in the most modern
systems of procedure, and, by no means least, the congested con-
ditions of modem courts. This tendency seems to the writer on the
whole desirable. Compulsion put upon a litigant to settle his dis-
putes at one time is not merely a proper safeguard to defendants
but saves time and expense to the court. 115 In view of modern
liberal provisions as to amendment, or even for starting a new ac-
lMlcCaskill, 34 YALI L. J. 614, 648 et. seq.
213See the common law authorities on res jidicata, and on the defense of
another action pending, e. g. SHIPIAN, C. L. PL. (Ed. Ball.) 39o n.; GOULD,
PL. 4th ed. V. Sec. 122, 124; "For the law, which 'abhors a multiplicity.of suits',
will not permit a defendant to be harassed, by two or more actions for the
same thing, where a complete remedy might be obtained by one of them. The
object of the rule is to prevent vexation." Cf. Bein v. Blazejerzyk, 213 Ill.
App. 243. See also "Privity and Mutuality in the Doctrine of Res Judicata,"
35 YALE L. J. 607-612, and cases cited in notes 114, 118, infra.
"14judgment in trover bars claims in trespass, implied assumpsit, detinue
and replevin. See cases cited in 30 YALE L. J. 942, n. 8; See also Johnson v.
Odom, Ii Ala. App. 364, 66 So. 853 detinue and trover; Davis & Co. v. Stukes.
122 S. C. 539, 115 S. E. 814 statutory replevin and conversion; Roberts v.
Moss, 127 Ky. 657, io6 S. W. 297, quasi contract and trespass; Leler v. Guild.
71 Colo. 349, 2o6 Pac. 8o3 tort and contract; LeVasser v. Chesborough Lum-
ber Co., 19o Mich. 403, 157 N. W. 74 quantum unernit and express contract:
Orino v. Beliveau, 122 Me. 168, iig Atl. 199 same; 34 YALt L. J. 883 n.
"25 See discussion 33 YALi L. J. 817; 35 Ibid. 85.
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tion where a previous one has failed for reasons not going to the
merits, the hardship upon a misinformed plaintiff is small.11
Same-Legal and Equitable Clains. The same argument is
made as to causes upon which legal or equitable remedies or both
may be sought, and particular criticism is made of a leading New
York case, holding that a matter once litigated in an action asking
for a legal remedy should not be relitigated in an action asking for
an equitable remedy." 7 But here the same conclusions should apply.
There seems no occasion for adopting the inconvenient rule that
there are separate causes of action for each claim, legal or equitable.
In fact to do so would be to set aside the well settled rule of res
judicata applied before the code, namely, that matter once threshed
out either at law or in equity could not be again litigated in the other
tribunal. 18 Formerly a litigant in the wrong court was not thereby
prevented from going into the other court; but there is no longer
reason for that particular rule. -ence the rule against splitting a
cause of action is properly applied to prevent the litigation of legal
and equitable claims on such cause at different times. 1 9
116Cf. SUNDERLAND'S CAS. CODE PL. 697; THROCKMORTON'S CAS. CODE
PL., ch. VI; Y. B. Smith, 25 COL. L. Rzv. 752, 756, et seq., discussing N. Y. C.
P. A. rule i66.
217Hahl v. Sugo, i6g N. Y. io9, 62 N. E. 135 criticised by Professor
McCaskill, 34 YALE L. J. 648, and 5 Am. L. ScH. R. 286. A better criticism
of the case is, not that there should be a further trial of the matters already
litigated there, but that the court does not seem to recognize the possibility of
further action upon the as yet unsatisfied judgment. 34 YALE L. J. 536, 541,
883.
"IsSee cases collected in I CooK, CAsEs oN EQUITy 76-88; 2 BLACK,
JUDGMENTS, 2nd ed. Secs. 517, 518. See also Barnett v. Western Assur. Co. 144
Ark. 462, 220 S. V. 465; Snell v. Turner Lumber Co. (1922, C. C. A. 2d)
285 Fed. 356; Medley v. Brown, (Tex. Civ. App. igi8) 202 S. W. 137;
Church v. Gallic, 76 Ark. 423, 88 S. W. 979; Fitzgerald v. Heady, 225 Mass.
75, 113 N. E. 884; McCreary v. Stallworth, 212 Ala. 238, 102 So. 52. But
compare Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 132 Ky. 435, i1 S. W.
374; Piro v. Shipley, 33 Pa. Super. Ct. 278. Matters which could not be put
in issue of course were not res adjudicata. See infra note 119; cf. Harlow
v. Pulsifer, 122 Me. 472, i0 Atl. 621.
119 Gilbert v. Boak Fish Co. 86 Minn. 365, go N. W. 867; Thompson v.
Myrick, 24 Minn. 4; Waldo v. Lockhard, ioi Neb. 797, i65 N. V. 154; Inder-
lied v. Whaley, 85 Hun, 63, 32 N. Y. Supp. 640; Yager v. Bedell, 20o6 App.
Div. 803, 201 N. Y. Supp. 466; Naugle v. Naugle, 89 Kan. 622, 132 Pac. 164;
Brice v. Starr, go Wash. 369, 156 Pac. 12. As to the effect of the code see
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The Test of Splitting. Various tests for the application of the
rule against splitting have been suggested. Thus there have been
stated that for the rule to apply (i) the evidence in the two suits
must be identical; (2) there must be a single right violated; (3)
there must be a single act or contract involved, without reference
to its effect; (4) there must be the same findings and judgment in-
volved; (5) in the case of contracts the consideration must be en-
tire.120  These may be suggestive but are obviously not to be taken
as conclusive tests in themselves. In fact the search for an auto-
matic rule of thumb is illusory as in law generally, particularly
procedural law. Such tests as identity of the evidence, or of the
right involved, are not true, if applied in the ordinary sense of the
terms, since the rule applies even though the suggested requisites
do not exist. The rule would seem more general and more vague
than as indicated by such tests. It would involve the same view
of cause of action supported by the writer elsewhere in connection
with other code rules-a group of operative facts giving rise to one
or more rights of action. 2 ' The size of the group will depend on
various conditions and considerations. In this connection previous
precedents in tort and contract law, the analogy of the former equity
cases, the intention of the parties in the case of contracts, may all
have proper scope. Where there is no prevailing standard other-
wise, the controlling consideration in determining the extent of the
cause should be trial convenience, with much discretion accorded
the trial court. The practical question how far witnesses and testi-
mony in each case will be identical is important. Hence the unity
of time and of occurrence of the acts relied- on will be largely de-
terminative.122
discussion in Perdue v. Ward, 88 W. Va., 371, xo6 S. E. 874; 22 CoL,. L. REv.
i8o; Royal Ins. Co. v. Stewart (Ind. App., 1918) 12 N. E. 3o7. Cf. also Yager
v. Bedel, 2o6 App. Div. 803, 2O N. Y. Supp. 466; 37 HARv. L. REv. 629; 34
YALE L. J. 884, notes 16, 17.
"'°See e. g. i C. J. iio9, iii6; 1 R. C. L. 344, 351.
"2'See discussion above in this article; also note i, supra.
"22Examples are given in succeeding notes. Important recent applications
of the general view suggested above, particularly to cases of different legal
claims upon the same cause are Chicag6, etc. Ry. v. Schendel, 46 Sup. Ct. 42o
(1926), claim by widow as administratrix under federal Employers' Liability
Act for death of her husband barred by her previous recovery as claimant
under a state workmen's compensation act; overruling cases such as Denni-
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It may be thought harsh to expeet a plaintiff in advance to de-
termine how the trial court is going to react to a particular case.
The answer is that this is no other or different risk than must be
run by people generally with respect to legal rules, and that the
statement of more seemingly precise principles is but a delusion;
for it is the vaguer test which is actually employed by the court,
however the rule is phrased. Moreover, practically, the burden on
the plaintiff is not severe. Many cases have become thoroughly set-
tled through- precedent; and these precedents, often established in
the substantive rules of torts, contracts and damages, should be
followed. Where the plaintiff is in doubt, a rule compelling him
always to take the course of the wider joinder is salutary.
In succeeding sections some of the more standardized situations
will be somewhat briefly considered. Their relation to various sub-
stantive rules of law should be noted.
Parties. Under the definition of cause of action here employed,
one cause may affect many parties, who may not be jointly interested
and where their joinder is only permissive. The rule of joinder of
parties and of splitting is not inconsistent, however, for, under all
rules of res judicata and of another action pending, not only must
the cause be the same, but the parties must be the same. 12 3
Waiver. Since the rule against splitting is largely for the pro-
tection of the defendant it may be waived by him, and is waived it
he fails to raise the objection in the action.124
son v. Payne, 293 Fed. 333; 33 YAL L. J. 326, 35 Ibid. ioi6, 37 HARV. L. Rsv.
778; and Luce v. N. Y. etc. Ry. 241 N. Y. 39 Mene. 52 N. E. 409 (1926)
affirming 213 App. Div. 374, 211 N. Y. Supp. 184 which had reversed
124 Misc. 590, 2o9 N. Y. Supp. 482; claim under the same federal Act barred
by previous action relying on claim under federal Boiler Inspection Act; 39
HARV. L. Rev. 399.
123See Southern Ry. Co. v. King 217 U. S. 524, 30 Sup. Ct. 594, affirming
i6o Fed. 332; 33 YALm L. J. 326, 35 Ibid. 607. Where parties are jointly
interested they may be required to join in a single suit, but this right may be
waived by the defendant. Carrington v. Crocker 37 N. Y. 336. While actions
by the same individual in different capacities are treated as actions by different
parties, it has been held, quite sensibly, that actions in form in different capac-
ities but actually for the ultimate benefit of the same person are by the same
person. Chicago etc. Ry. v. Schendel, note 122 supra; Mo. etc. Ry. v. Wulf,
226 U. S. 570, 33 Sup. Ct. 135.
124Carrington v. Crocker, supra; Vineseck v. Great Northern Ry. Co.
136 Minn. 96, I6i N. W. 494; Hardwicke Etter Co. v. Durant, 77 Okla. 2o2,
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CONTRACT CLAIMS
Single or Divisible Contracts. Where a contract contains several
promises by one person it is important to determine whether it is
to be considered "single" or "divisible." Where "single", separate
actions cannot be instituted on the various promises; where divisible
they may be sued on separately.125 The test is the intent of the
parties and how they regarded the promises. A method of de-
termining such intention, where, as is usually the case, it is not
definitely expressed, is to determine "the apportionability of the
consideration," i.e. whether the consideration seems to have been
given as a whole for all the promises, and hence they are indivisible,
or whether a part of the consideration applies to each separate
promise so that they were viewed separately by the parties.226 The
courts seem to tend to hold that, unless dearly divisible, all breaches
of a single contract must be sued on at one time. 2 7  Thus while
there is some conflict as to whether one or more suits will lie upon
187 Pac. 484; Johnson v. Prineville, IOI Or. ii9, 196 Pac. 821; Matheny v.
Preston Hotel Co., 14o Tenn. 41, 203 S. W. 327; Brice v. Starr, 93 Wash.
5oi, 161 Pac. 347, reversing go Wash. 369, 156 Pac. 12. See as to partial
assignments, Clark and Hutchins, "The Real Party in Interest," 34 YALE
L. J. 259, 266; as to fraud or mistake as a ground of waiver, 2 A. L. R.
530, 534-542-
225Secor v. Sturgis, note i1O supra; Williams-Abbott Electric Co. v.
Model Electric Co., 134 Ia. 665, 112 N. W. 181, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 529 with
note; Pakas v. Hollingshead, 184 N. Y. 211, 77 N. E. 40, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.)
io42; Conkle v. Laughlin, 83 Pa. Super Ct. 468; Helsey v. Am. Mineral Prod'n.
Co., 118 Wash. 591, 204 Pac. i9o; Felt City Townsite Co. v. Felt Inv. Co.,
50 Utah 364, x67 Pac. 835.
126Bridgeport v. Scott Co. 94 Conn. 461, iog Atl. 162; Kalm v. Orenstein,
12 Del. Ch. 344, 114 Atl. 165; Peist v. Richmond, 97 Vt. 97, 122 Atl. 420;
29 YAL4 L. J. 296.
"12Thus in Secor v. Sturgis, supra, it is said: "Perhaps as simple and safe
a test as the subject admits of, by which to determine whether a case belongs
to one class or the other, is by inquiring whether it rests upon one or several
acts or agreements. In the case of torts, each trespass, or conversion, or
fraud, gives a right of action, and but a single one, however numerous the items
of wrong or damage may be; in respect to contracts, express or implied, each
contract affords one and only one cause of action." As the text shows, this is
too broad a statement. Cf. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkesbarre etc. Ry.
Co. 98 N. J., 5o7, 12o Atl. 734 (separate suits lie on detached defaulted coupons
on bonds) ; Gaddis v. Williams, 81 Okla. 289, 198 Pac. 483; Ashless Coal Co. v.
Davis, 183 Ky. 4o6, 209 S. W. 532. Cf. also Johnson v. Prineville, ioo Or.
11g, 1g6 Pac. 821.
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a penal bond conditioned on the performance of various promises,
there seems a clear tendency to force a single suit only.12  This
should be taken subject to the qualification stated in the next para-
graph, that only breaches occurring before the date of suit need be
included.
Continuing Contracts. Where the contract is one calling for
continuous or successive performance by the promisor, all breaches
to the date of suit must be included; while those thereafter occurring
may be claimed in a later suit.1 2  A question may arise, however,
whether the contract may not have been entirely repudiated by the
breach in question so that one action must be brought for entire
damages, present and prospective; or whether successive actions
may be brought claiming damages only to the date of the suit. The
question seems to turn upon the character of the breach viewed in
the light of the intent of the parties in making the contract., 30 More-
over where mutual promises made by both parties are considered
dependent, a breach by one may give the other party the option of
treating, or according to some cases, may force him to treat, the
contract as definitely and fully repudiated, so that only a single ac-
tion will lie.''
'28Acc. Commrs. of Barton Co. v. Plumb, 2o Kan. 147; State v. Davis, 35
Mo. 4o6; Rissler v. Ins. Co., I5O Mo. 366; Fish v. Tank, 12 Wis. 307; Nichols
v. Alexander, 28 Wis. 118; contra, Boyce v. Christy, 47 Mo. 70.
129Adv. Lamp Shade Cor. v. Bloom, 125 Misc., R. 829, 211 N. Y. Supp.
568; Thomas v. Carpenter, 123 Me. 241, 122 Atl. 576; Margues v. Mir. (N. J.
1926) 133 Atl. 521; cases in notes 134-137. Many of the codes provide that suc-
cessive actions may be maintained upon the same contract or transaction, when-
ever after the former action was brought a new cause of action has arisen;
Alaska Rev. St. 1913 Sec. 1314; Arkansas, Dig. St. 1921, Sec. 1083; California
C. C. P. 1923, Sec. 1047; Idaho, St. 1919 Sec. 1227, Kentucky, Carroll's Code
x91g, Sec. 686; Mont. Rev. Code, 1921, Sec. 981g; Nevada, R. L. 1912, Sec.
5477; Oregon Code 1920, Sec. 525, Utah L. 1917, Sec. 7212.
13OBadger v. Titcomb, 15 Pick, (Mass.) 409; Breckenridge v. Lee, 3 A. K.
Marsh, Ky. 446; Phelps v. N. H. & Northampton Co., 43 Conn. 453 (contract
to repair fences a continuing one) ; Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Davidson (Ky. i9o9)
115 S. W. 770; Laughlin v. Levenbaum, 248 Mass. 170, 142 N. E. 9o6. Cf.
CoRaiN's ANSON ON CONTRACTS, Sec. 392; "Has one party so far made default
that the consideration for which the other gave his promise has in effect wholly
failed?"
' 3'CORRIN's ANSON ON CONTRACTS, ch. XV; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS,
ch. 36; Bridgeport v. Aetna Indemnity Co., 91 Conn. 197, 205, 99 Atl. 566;
Bridgeport Hardware Mfg. Corp. v. Bouniol, 89 Conn. 254, 93 Atl. 674; Pakas
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Same-Employment Contracts. An example of these principles
is afforded by the contract for personal service. If an employee is
not paid his monthly or weekly salary as agreed, he may sue for
the installments as due, according to the principles stated in the
next paragraph; or he may probably consider his obligation to work
as dependent on the agreement to pay, and elect to treat the contract
as at an end. If, however, he is definitely dismissed from his em-
ployment, the more generally followed rule is that he must sue for
damages for an entire breach. The doctrine of "constructive serv-
ice",-that he may still sue for each sum as it should have fallen
due, had he been permitted to work,-is largely repudiated. 32  A
further question arises where there are back wages unpaid, whether
there are two causes, one for the wages due and one for the breach
of contract, which may be sued on separately, or a single one, which
cannot be split. The latter seems the better view. 133
Installment Contracts and Running Accounts. On installment
contracts a like rule applies, namely, that successive suits may be
brought as each installment falls due, but all installments due at the
time suit is brought must be claimed or are waived. The rule has
been applied to various forms of such contracts, including rent under
v. Hollingshead, x84 N. Y. 211, 77 N. E. 40 (criticised in 3 L. R. A. (N. S.)
2O42; see n. 135, infra); Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Rascoe, 12 F. (2d) 693.
Cf. also the doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract where the promisee has
the option to treat the contract as totally repudiated. Corbin and Williston,
supra. See also a similar question as to continuing trespass and nuisance,
discussed below.
132Viall v. Lionel Mfg. Co., 92 Conn. 341, IO2 Atl. 709; 9o Conn. 694,
700, 98 Atl. 329; Safford v. Morris Metal Products Co., 97 Conn. 65o, 656,
ix8 Atl. 37; Harrington v. Empire Cream Sep'r Co. 120 Me. 388, 115 AtL. 89
with comment 31 YALr L. J. 441; Ogden Howard Co. v. Brand, 7 Boyce
(Del.) 482, io8 Atl. 277 with comment 69 U. or PA. L. REv. 282, 283. But cf.
Strauss v. Meertief, 64 Ala. 299; Moore v. Kelly etc. Co., ii Ga. 371, 36 S.
E. 802.
"'3Acc. Keedy v. Long, 71 Md. 385, 18 Atl. 704, 5 L. R. A. 759 and note;
Richardson v. Eagle Mach. Work, 78 Ind. 422; James v. Allen Co., 44 Ohio
St. 226, 6 N. E. 246; Bridgeford & Co.- v. Meagher, 144 Ky. 479, 239 S. W.
750. Contra, Perry v. Dickerson, 85 N. Y. 345; Lezinsky v. Roulaix Mills,
2io App. Div. X02, 205 N. Y. Supp. 573; Viall and Lionel Mfg. Co. supra, note
132. See I C. J. 111 5 .
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a lease 134 and contracts of sale.135 There is a question whether the
same rule applies to a running account where the items making up
the account do not arise pursuant to a single agreement. It seems
usually to be held that it does. 1 36  The rule is different, however,
where credit is given for the various items.1 37
Separate Contracts. In general separate contracts, though made
at the same time, are treated as independent causes of action, and
hence not subject to the rule against splitting.3 8 This would seem
ordinarily a sound conclusion but should not be an invariable rule,
for the facts concerning each contract and its breach may be very
similar. Then, too, this might unduly emphasize form; for promises
made at the same time orally might be considered separate contracts;
whereas if reduced to writing in a single instrument, they would
be termed a single contract. An example of a broader view is the
case of the running account just considered. 139
134Burrit v. Belfry, 47 Conn. 323; See v. See, 294 Mo. 495, 242 S. W. 949,
24 A. L. R. 88o, with note 885-897; Hare v. Winfree, 131 Wash. 138, 229 Pac.
16, with comment, 34 YALn L. J. 677. Cf. Johnson v. Johnson, 107 Okla. 94,
230 Pac. 48o with comment 38 HARV. L. Rtv. 691.
135Simon v. Bierbauer, 154 App. Div. 5o6, 139 N. Y. Supp. 327; White v.
Bean & Co., 16 Ala. App. 330, 77 So. 9241; Kruse v. Lakeside Biscuit Co., 198
Mich. 736, x65 N. W. 6og. In Pakas v. Hollingshead, 184 N. Y. 215, 77 N. E.
40, it is held, Cullen, C. J., dissenting, that on breach of an installment contract
of purchase, entire damages must be recovered; see criticism 3 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1042.
13OAcc. Williams-Abbott Elec. Co. v. Model Elec. Co., 134 Ia. 665, I2
N. IV. I81, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 529 with note; Banner Grain Co. v. Burr
Farmers Elevator & Supply Co., 162 Minn. 334, 202 N. W. 740; Peper Automo-
bile Co. v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. (Mo. App. 19x6) 187 S. V. iog. Contra
Badger v. Titcomb, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 409; Phelps v. Abbott, 116 Mich. 624,
74 N. W. ioO (by statute). Contra, where the parties so intend, Joseph T.
Ryerson & Son v. Stark Inland Mach. Works, (Mo., 1925) 270 S. W. 755;
Mayo v. Martin, 186 N. C. 1, 118 S. E. 830.
137Ryan v. Waukesha Spring Brewing Co., 63 Ill. App. 334. Where,
however, all the terms of credit have expired, all must be included in the same
action. Williams-Abbott Elec. Co. v. Model Elec. Co. supra. Cf. Clay v.
Meadows, ioo W. Va. 487, 530 S. E. 656; 26 COL. L. Rgv. 634.
238Millard v. Mo. K. & T. R. R. Co., 86 N. Y. 441; Rex v. Hereford-
shire, i B. & A. 672; Upson Co. v. Erie R. Co., 213 App. Div. 262, 25o N. Y.
Supp. 112. See note 84, supra.
23 9Cases cited, notes 134-137, supra. Cf. Towusley v. Niagara Ins. Co.,
258 N. Y. 228, 112 N. E. 924 (the contracts were held severable, but four
judges dissented); Loomis v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co., 114 Misc. 480, 186 N. Y.
Supp. 700.
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Partial Assignments. A creditor cannot by assigning part of his
claim to another, subject the debtor to two suits. By the more usual
procedure, the defendant may compel joinder of assignor and as-
signee, but this right is waived where no objection is raised.140
TORT CLAIMS
Single Act or Several Closely Connected Acts. Many interest-
ing cases arise where the defendant's tortious conduct is in question
and the plaintiff has suffered two or more forms of damages. The
test here also seems as before suggested, the consideration of the
group of facts dealing with the defendant's breach of duty and the
limitation of the size of a single cause to a unit of convenient extent.
Thus where the defendant takes away two or more kinds of personal
property at one time,14' or where a train strikes the plaintiff's
cattle at distances only slightly apart,'142 or where a fire spreads to
different premises of the plaintiff,143 in these and similar cases it is
held that there is a single cause of action. Examples of this kind
may be greatly multiplied. 4 4
14oSee Clark and Hutchins, op. cit., note 124, supra and Dickinson v.
Tyson, 125 App. Div. 735, nio N. Y. Supp. 269; Porter v. Lane Constr'n Corp.,
212 App. Div. 528, 2o9 N. Y. Supp., 541; Kinart v. Seabury Co., 191 Ia. 937,
183 N. W. 586; U. S. F. & G. Co. v. Great S. W. Petrol Co., 97 Okla. 79,
222 Pac. 56o; City of Pueblo v. Dye, 44 Colo. 35, 96 Pac. 969. Cf. Carville
v. Mirror Films Inc., 178 App. Div. 644, x65 N. Y. Supp. 676, aff'd 226 N. Y.
683, 123 N. E. 858.
i'4 Farrington v. Payne, 15 Johns, 432; O'Neal v. Brown, 21 Ala. 482;
cf. Phillips v. Berryman, 3 Dougl. 286.
' 4 2Brannenburg v. Ind. P. & C. Ry, 13 Ind. lO3; Chicago etc. Ry. v.
Ramsey, 168 Ind. 390, 81 N. B. 79 (2oo feet apart) ; but see Mo. P. R. Co. v.
Scaniman, 41 Kan. 521, 21 Pac. 590 (5oo feet apart).
143 Knowlton v. R. R. 147 Mass. 6o6, 18 N. E. 58o; Trask v. Hartford,
etc. R. Co., 2 Allen, (Mass.) 331.
244 Dellard v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 58 Mo. 69 (injury to the plaintiff's
horse and harness); Cracraft v. Cotzhran, 16 Iowa 301 (slander in a single
conversation); Hazard Powder Co. v. Volger, 3 Wyo. 189, i8 Pac. 636
(injury to plaintiff's wife, house and furniture); cf. Smith v. Warden, 86
Mo. 382, 399; Pierro v. St. Paul etc., R. Co., 37 Minn. 314, 34 N. W. 38
(action for use and possession of land bars recovery for injury to the estate
during the occupation). As to different claims upon the same acts of negli-
gence, see note 77, supra. Repeated publications of same libel held separate
causes, Woods v. Pangburn, 75 N. Y. 495; Cook v. Connors, 215 N. Y. 175,
lO9 N. R. 78, L. R. A. 1916 A, lO74; so of different trespasses, De La Guerra
v. Newhall, 55 Cal. 21; or of recovery of different tracts of land, Roddy v.
Harah, 62 Pa. 129.
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Continuing Trespass or Nuisance. A difficult question has arisen
in the law of torts and of damages as to the situation where the de-
fendant's acts are of a continuing nature, as is often the case where
there is trespass or nuisance injuring the plaintiff's realty. Should
the injury be considered permanent, the plaintiff compelled to sue
once and for all, and the damages be the lessened market value of
the land? But then the defendant may cease the wrongful act at
any time, in which case the plaintiff has already been recompensed
for a permanent loss which does not exist. Should the injury be
considered merely temporary, recovery allowed only to date of suit,
and the damages considered as merely the lessened rental value of the
premises? This is to allow successive suits in cases where from the
practical standpoint the injury will never be repaired. There have
been diverse rules suggested, some of them based upon the physical
-character of the defendant's act and whether it appears to be one
likely to be undone or not. 14 5  But this is rightly considered an un-
certain test. The prevailing rule is to hold only injuries permanent
where the defendant would have to commit a fresh wrong to undo
them, (as in the case of a structure on the plaintiff's land, necessitat-
ing a fresh entry by the defendant to take it down), 14 or where
legally permitted by the state, as a railroad right of way.147  Thus
a nuisance on the defendant's own land would be considered tempor-
ary. 48 Professor McCormick has recently advocated a possibly
more satisfactory rule, perhaps somewhat in line with the Iowa cases,
to the effect that if the defendant does not cease his acts within a
145Cole & Crane v. May, i85 Ky. 135, 214 S. W. 885, Smith v. Dallas
Utility Co., 27 Ga. App. 22, 107 S. E. 381; cf. Irvine v. City of Oelwein, 170
Ia. 653, 15o N. W. 674; City of Otfumwa v. Nicholson, i61 Ia. 473, 143 N. W.
439; and complete annotation, L. R. A. I916 E. 958-997 (cases), 997-1074
(annotation).
'4 6Uline v. N. Y. C. etc. R. Co., ioi N. Y. 98, 4 N. E. 536; Stoops v.
Pistachio, 70 Cal. App. 772, 234 Pac. 423; Pahika v. Chicago etc. Ry., 62
Okla. 223, I6I Pac. 544; Wilkerson v. St. Louis etc. Ry. (Mo., App. 1920) 224
S. W. 72; Trinity Portland Cement Co. v. Horton (Tex. Civ. App. 191g),
214 S. W. 510; 29 YALU L. J. 204; 25 ibid. 82; i8 MicH. L. R~v. 679. Cf. Town
of Marlboro v. Sisson, 31 Conn. 332.
147Shaffer v. Penna. Co., 265 Pa. 542, IO9 Atl. 284; Schlosser v. Sanitary
Dist. 2W9 Ill. 82, 132 N. E. 291; 17 ILL. L. Rtv. 244; authorities note 146 supra.
'48 See Seven Lakes Reservoir Co. v. Majors, 69 Colo., 590 196 Pac. 334;
City of Mangum v. Sun Set Field, 73 Okla., IH, 17 Pac. 50; cases in note 146
supra and the L. R. A. note cited in note 145 supra.
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reasonable time, the plaintiff should have the option of treating the
injury either as temporary, or as permanent. In the latter case he
practically forces the defendant to buy him out by paying the dam-
ages awarded."4 9
Single Injury to Person and Property: Where one act of the
defendant causes injury to both persons and property, (e.g. the
negligence of the defendant injuring both the plaintiff and his vehicle)
the courts are in conflict as to whether there is a single cause of ac-
tion which cannot be split or more than one. It would seem, fol-
lowing the principles above stated, that since the acts involved and
much the greater part of the testimony are identical, there is but a
single cause; and this is the holding of many courts. 50 On the other
hand, the courts of England and New York, among others, have
held otherwise.'", The reasons given are not those of trial con-
venience but technical objections concerning the resulting rights.
Thus, it is said that different periods of limitation apply, and that
one right is assignable and survives death of either party while the
other is not assignable and does not so survive.'52 But this presents
no insuperable reason why all the rights such as they are cannot
be adjusted at one time. The argument of convenience in favor of
149C. 'LT. McCormick, "Permanent Injury, Nuisance and Trespass," 37
HARv. L. Rxv. 574. Cf. Thompson v. Ill. Cent. R. ii Ia. 35, 179 N. W. i9 r ;
i9 MIcH. L. RIv. 342, but see ii HARv. L. Ri. ix8; Bartlett v. Grasselli
Chem. Co., 92 W. Va. 445, 115 S. E. 457, 28 A. L. R. 54, 6i with note; L. R. A.
I916 E. io68. See also H. F. Goodrich, "Permanent Structures and Continuing
Nuisance: The Iowa Rule," 4 IA. L. BuLLr. 67.
'5 ODoran v. Cohen, 147 Mass. 342, 17 N. E. 647; King v. C. M. & St.
P. R. Co., 8o Minn. 83, 82 N. W. 1113, 5o L. R. A. i6r and note; Kimball v.
L. & N. R. Co., 94. Miss. 405, 48 So. 23o; Cassidy v. Berkovitz, 169 Ky. 785,
i85 S. W. 129; Jenkins v. Skelton, 21 Ariz. 663, 192 Pac. 249; Fields v. Phila.
Rapid Transit Co., 273 Pa. 282, 117 Atl. 59; 32 YALI L. J. I9O; THROCK-
MORTON'S CAS., CODn PL., 216, 217, 218, 219.
151Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Pay. Co., I7O N. Y. 40, 62 N. E. 772, rev'g 31
App. Div. 302, 52 N. Y. Supp. 817; Brunsden v. Humphrey, 14 Q. B. D. 141;
Lord Coleridge, C. J. dis.; Ochs v. P. S. R. Co., 8L N. J. L. 66i, 8o Atl. 493,
36 L. R. A. N. S. 24o and note; 12 COL. L. Rev. 261; Watson v. Tex. & P. R.
Co. 8 Tex. Civ. App. 144, 27 S. W. 924. Cf. Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N. Y.
235, 1I N. B. 837 (injury to realty and at same time to personalty results in
two causes of action), but see Van Ommen v. Hogeman, (N. J. 1924) 126 At.
468; 34 YALx L. J. 56o.
152Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Pay. Co. supra.
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the latter course seems much more potent. 53 Again it is said in the
same case that in the present New York code at least, injuries to the
person form a different class for the purpose of joinder of causes
from injuries to property. But these classes deal with entirely
separate and independent causes, not with the question of what is
the extent of a cause. Furthermore even if there are two causes
they are joinable under the same transaction class-a joinder which
shows that the difficulties raised by the court are not insurmount-
able.154  A rule leading to two lawsuits where one will accomplish
the same results is not to be favored."
CONSOLIDATION AND SEVERANCE oF ACTIONS
As to the quotation from Secor v. Sturges, given above, 5 '
shows, if the plaintiff avoids the rule against splitting and is held
to have two distinct causes of action, it is in general entirely at his
option whether to join them or not. The only exception seems to
be one coming from the common law, that the court on motion of
the defendant may at its discretion order two or more suits con-
solidated in one,-as separate counts therein-in order to avoid
undue hardship upon the defendant. 5 7  The cases must be of the
kind which could originally have been joined, and the court need
153See 32 YALE L. J. i9o. Cf. Lloyd's Underwriters v. Vicksburg Traction
Co., io6 Miss. 244, 63 So. 445; 27 HA~v. L. Rrv. 490.
154See cases cited note 6I, supra. The statement in the Reilly case is
somewhat criticised in McInerney v. Main, note 6i, supra.
' 55In a thoughtful article, "Writs v. Rights", I8 MIcH. L. REv. 255, Pro-
fessor L. P. Wilson argues against the emphasis often placed upon tests based
upon procedural history or ancient writs. With this very desirable premise he
reaches the conclusion that the English and New York rule is to be supported.
a conclusion which seems to the writer at variance with the premise. See also
PHrLLIPs, CODE Pr.. Secs. 30, 31, 440, 441; cf. Loyd, 6o U. oF PA. L. REv. 53i;
Rossman, 2 ORE. L. REv. io6; 57 Am. LAw REv. 532; 8 ST. Louis L. REV. 51;
24 HARv. L. REv. 492; L. R. A. i916 B. 743; Ann. Cas. 1912 D. 255.
156P. 417 supra.
'57GOULD, PL., IV 103; Secor v. Sturgis, note n0, supra; Trook v. Crouch
82 Ind. App. 3o9, 137 N. E. 773. There seems to be a conflict as to whether
.-uch power existed in equity. For denial of the power, see Bouldin v. Taylor,
152 Tenn. 97, 275 S. W. 340, criticised in 39 HARV. L. Rrv. 1094; for cases
contra, see i C. J. 1123. The term consolidation is often used in three sensEs:
(i) where several actions are combined into a single one wherein a single
judgment is rendered-the situation here considered; (2) where several acticns
are tried together, each remaining a separate action; (3) where all but cne
of several actions are stayed until one is tried. Aiinger v. Pa. R. Co. 2.52
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not order the consolidation if it does not approve. 153 Most of the
codes contain provisions of a similar nature.15 9
Under the statutes of some states, however, the provisions for
consolidation have been greatly extended. In Arkansas the statute
is used by a plaintiff to extend the rules as to joinder of parties,
and the principles of consolidation have had the result of greatly
liberalizing the party joinder rules. 60 In New York consolidation
may be had wherever it can be done without prejudice to a substantial
right; and it is had where the actions are pending in different coun-
ties. The causes must still be such that they might originally have
Pa. 242, io5 AtI. 87; Lumianski v. Tessler, 213 Mass. 182, 99 N. B. 051 ;
Lee v. Kearney Tp. 42 N. J. L. 543. Where there is a true consolidation the
allegations of the various complaints may be taken together and treated as
one pleading, so that the allegations in one complaint will remedy the defects
or omissions in another. Tyler v. Metrovich Bldg. Co., 47 Cal. App. 5 19o
Pac. 208.
'5 8Shooters Island Shipyard Co. v. Standard Shipbldg. Corp., 4 F (2d)
io, R. R. Comm. of Ga. v. So. Ry. Co., 154 Ga. 297, 114 S. E. 335; Trook
v. Crouch, note 157, supra; Tenenbaum v. Dunlop, 20o App. Div. 604, 193
N. Y. Supp. 4o7; Bond v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 77 W. Va. 757, 88 S. E. 389;
Thompson v. Mitchell, 128 Wash. 192, 222 Pac. 617.
'59The statutes provide for consolidation by order of the court on mo-
tion; usually where the actions are pending in the same court between the
same parties and on causes of action which might have been united; though in
some states simply where the actions might originally have been joined; Alaska,
R. S. 1913, Sec. 1315; California, C. C. P. 1923, Sec. 1048; Colorado, C. C. P.
1921, Sec. 2o; Idaho, R. S. 1919, Sec. 7228; Iowa, code 1924, Sec. 11226;
Kansas, Rev. St. 1923, Sec. 6o-765; Minn. G. S. 1923, Sec. 9264; Missouri,
R. S. 1919, Sec. 1221 (actions between the same parties on liquidated demands),
Montana, Rev. Code 1921, Sec. 9820; Nebraska, Comp. St. 1922, Sec. 86o3, 4;
Nev. R. Le 1912, Sec. 5478; North Dakota, Comp. L. 1913, Sec. 7965; Ohio,
Gen. Code 1925, Sec. 11368; Okla. Comp. St. 1921, Sec. 324, 325; Oregon,
Code -192o, Sec. 526; Utah, R. L. 1917, Sec. 7219; Washington, Rem. & Ball.
Code 1922, Sec. 396; Wyoming, L. I92O, Sec. 5713; Wisconsin, Stat. 1921,
Sec. 2792. The tendency is therefore to restrict consolidation to actions be-
tween the same parties, N. Y. Jobbing House v. Sterling Fire Ins. Co., 54
Utah, 394, 182 Pac. 361; Farmers etc. Bk. v. Foster, 132 S. C. 410, 129 S. E.
629 (saying that the rule is otherwise as to equity cases); but see Central
States Gas Co. v. Parker Russell Mining Co., 196 Ind., 163, 142 N. R. 119;
Winnek v. Moore, 164 Wis. 53, 159 N. W. 558.
'6OArk. Dig. 1921, Sec. lo8i, passed in 19o5, providing that where causes
are pending of a like nature or relative to the same question, the court may
consolidate them when it appears reasonable. Under this statute a husband
and wife may join in a suit for personal injuries to each. Little Rock Gas
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been joined.16' The provisions apply to matter which is the sub-
ject of counterclaim so that if A sues B in X county and B sues
A in Y county, the court may order consolidation, directing the
county in which it thinks the venue should be laid.""'
Somewhat similar provisions apply to the severance of actions,
which under the most modern codes may be ordered where it may
be done without prejudice to a substantial right of the parties.'6 '
Provisions of this kind seem highly desirable. They give the
trial court discretion to prevent injustice to any party but yet per-
mit it to cause one lawsuit to take the place of two or three. This
is not only a saving in time, trouble and expense to the parties and
the state, but a preventive of the injustice which may result from
divergent decisions in each separate case.
ELECTION o REMEDIES
The traditional statement of the rule of election remedies is that
"the choice of one among inconsistent remedies bars recourse to the
others."'8' 4 This seemingly harsh rule has been the subject of care-
& Fuel Co. v. Coppedge, 116 Ark. 334, 172 S. W. 885. See also New Mexico,
Ann St. 1915, Sec. 4212, that when actions of a like nature or relative to the
same question are pending, they may be consolidated.
161N. Y. C. P. A. Sec. 96, 97; Cowles v. Eidlitz & Son, Inc., 121 Misc.
340, 2oi N. Y. Supp. 254 (1923) with note 24 CoL. L. Rtv. 208. While the
parties need not be the same, it is held that the actions must arise out of the
same transaction. Brady v. Madison Lunch, Inc., i99 App. Div. 640, i92
N. Y. Supp. io; cf. Levine v. Products Mfg. Co., 216 N. Y. Supp. 433 (1926).
See Brennan v. Nat'I Eq. Investment Co. Inc., 2io App. Div. 426, 2o6 N. Y.
Supp. 28o, motion by one plaintiff where not all the others consent. Cf. Dexter
Sulp. & Paper Co. v. Hearst, 2o6 App. Div. 101, 2o0 N. Y. Supp. 413, Sec.
97 A of the C. P. A. provides for the consolidation of actions of libel.
le-lGibbs v. Sokol, 216 App. Div. 26o, 214 N. Y. Supp. 533 (1926): Cf.
Borzilleri v. Brockway Motor Truck Corp. 124 Misc. 905, 21o N. Y. Supp.
i7; White v. Richmond Lt. & R. Co., 211 App. Div. 86i, 206 N. Y. Supp. 872.
l3N. Y. C. P. A. Sec. 96; Gould v. Gould, 124 Misc. 240, 207 N. Y.
Supp. 137. The section is permissive only, Sherlock v. Manwaren, 2o8 App.
Div. 538, 203 N. Y. Supp. 709. Cf. Robloff v. Folkman, 174 Wis. 504, 182
N. W. 735; Rich v. Fry, i96 Ind. 3o3, 146 N. E. 393 and statutes in note 24,
supra. No severance can be had where there is only a single cause of action
stated. Valentine v. Perlman, 216 App. Div. 548, 215 N. Y. Supp. 338.
164Deinard v. Deinard, 6 MINN. L. Rv. 341, 480; See also Hine, "Elec-
tion of Remedies, a Criticism," 26 HARv. L. RIv. 707; Comment, "Modern
Views of the Election of Remedies," 34 YAiE L. J. 665; 36 HARv. L. REv. 712;
W. H. Griffith, i6 L. Q. R. i6o; J. F. W. Galbraith, 16 L. Q. REv. 269; 3
COOK'S CAS. EQUITY, 145, 535; ICENER, QUASI CONTrACTS (1893) 203-213.
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ful discussion by learned writers who have pointed out that while
the rule is currently stated as applying to remedies, it is almost
wholly limited to election as a choice of substantive rights. Thus,
there may be election between properties (as between dower or
other property interest and devise) or election between termination
and continuation of contractual relations (affirmance or disaffirmance
of contracts). In fact it has been asserted that there are only two
situations where a true choice of remedies has been compelled,-the
choice on conversion of a chattel of suing for the conversion or
waiving the tort and suing in assumpsit, and the choice, in a suit
against a co-tenant, of suing in assumpsit for rents and profits, or
in ejectment with a claim for damages for mesne profits,-and that
both of these are of doubtful validity under code pleading.165 Out-
side of such anomalous cases it is ordinarily stated that not the bring-
ing of the action, not even the judgment, but only its satisfaction,
bars further remedy. Thus it is the satisfaction of the judgment,
not the judgment itself, which is said to pass title to a chattel to
the defendant in an action for its conversion.'6" Furthermore, the
privilege of the plaintiff to dismiss a suit he has begun, before a
judgment on the merits, and to start another, is well recognized. 167
In general, therefore, there is no compulsion to choose one remedy
in place of another, where there is a real choice.'6 3
In connection with the joinder of actions, discussed above, ref-
'6 'Deinard v. Deinard, supra, at pp. 359-362, 495-507. Cf. A. L. Corbin,
"'Waiver of Tort," 19 YALE L. J. 221, 239; 28 YALE L. J. 409, criticising
Shonkweiler v. Harrington, io2 Neb. 7I0, 169 N. W. 258.
166See cases such as Brinsmead v. Harrison, L. R. 6 C. P. 584, 7 C. P.
547; Miller v. Hyde, i6i Mass. 472, 37 N. E. 769; and other cases cited in
the writer's comment "Judgment or Satisfaction as Passing Title," 30 YALE
L. J. 742; see also J. B. AMEs, LECTURES I LEGAL HISTORY 209. As pointed
out, however, in the comment, the effect of the doctrine of res judicata should
be carefully considered in these cases.
167See Carson v. Greeley, 107 Neb. 6og, 187 N. W. 47; Brown v. Ball,
43 N. D. 314, 174 N. W. 629; Navajo-Apache Bank & Trust Co. v. Desmont,
i9 Ariz. 335, 170 Pac. 789, and cases cited, 34 YALE L. J. 668, n. i8.
168in 36 HARV. L. REv. 712, the origin of the rule of election of remedies
is found in the rule that a plaintiff should not get a double satisfaction or an
unfair advantage beyond securing his legal claim and it is said that in modern
English law no such rule obtains. The rules of merger, estoppel, satisfaction,
res judicata are sufficient to prevent a plaintiff from obtaining an unjust advan-
tage.
JOINDER OF CAUSES
erence was made to the practice of making alternate, and perhaps
conflicting, statements of the same cause of action in separate counts,
and that some courts have forced the plaintiff to elect which count
he shall stand upon. 1 9 This also is not a true case of election of
remedies. The fundamental reason for forcing a choice is not to
compel the plaintiff to choose between inconsistent remedies but to
compel him to state the true facts; and the courts which permit the
plaintiff to make allegations in the alternative do so in the belief
that he is stating the facts just so far as they are clear to him. 7 0
The modem liberal doctrine of amendment, even at trial, also shows
there is no real election in this situation. 7 .'
But even if there is practically no true election of remedies, the
doctrine as it applies to substantive law is important from the stand-
point of pleading. Assume one has a choice of two substantive
rights, as in the case of a contract procured by fraud, where the
contract may be either affirmed or disaffirmed, when does he finally
and irrevocably make his choice? Now it may be decisively made
before action is brought ;172 or at any time the plaintiff may be held
estopped by his actions from asserting one of the rights. 7 3  But if
the free choice still remains open to him when he starts suit, does
169See notes 88-97, supra.
170See Clark, "The Complaint in Code Pleading," 35 YALx L. J. 259,
277-279; Hankin, 33 YALE L. J. 365. Under this head fall cases such as
Joannes Bros. v. Lamborn, note 49, supra, holding that a complaint claiming
rescission of a contract does not justify a judgment for damages for its
breach.
"Authorities cited, note I16, supra.
172Usually there will be elements of estoppel, but there may be cases of a
simple choice already made, by express act or by reason of a binding statute.
Thus under many statutes election to take dower or statutory share must be
expressly filed in the probate court within a certain period or else the claimant
is held to have waived the claim and elected to take under the will. Conn.
G. S. 1918, Sec. 5053, 5055; Deinard v. Deinard, supra note 165, at p. 346,
referring to the Minnesota statute.
17 31n 34 YALU L. J. 665 are considered situations giving rise to estoppel,
criticising Frederickson v. Nye, io Ohio St. 484, 144 N. E. 299. Cf. Cardozo,
J., in Schenck v. State Line Tel. Co., 238 N. Y. 308, 312, 144 N. E. 592, 593,
35 A. L. R. i149: "Indeed it is probable that some element either of ratifica-
tion or of estoppel is at the root of most cases, if not all, in which an election
of remedies, once made, is viewed as a finality." Approved Richard v. Credit
Suisse, 242 N. Y. 346, 152 N. E. 1io (1926) ; 34 YALE L. J. 104; 37 HARv. L.
Rev. 914 (on the decision below).
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the form of suit show a final election? From the procedural stand-
point, this is probably the most important question as to election.
In fact, the statement of the rule given at the beginning of this ac-
tion appears to refer to this question and to signify that an affirma-
tive answer is to be given. Such has been the view of many cases,
especially the older.1 7 4 But this is to attach finality to the allegations
of the complaint, and as a practical matter, we know that is now
rarely done in code pleading. Suppose the plaintiff to begin his suit
on one theory, may he never thereafter shift to another theory?
Obviously he should not if there has been any real misleading of the
defendant, which cannot be cured by an amendment and a continu-
ance. But in default of this it would seem more consistent with
code practice generally and in fact with modern ideas of pleading,
to hold that the plaintiff may shift his position from that stated in
the declaration. This is now the holding of many cases. 7 5
When should the election become final? As indicated above, the
answer may be given by substantive rules of law or by the application
of the doctrine of estoppel. But if not so answered, it would seem
that from the procedural standpoint there is no declaration of a
final election by the mere form in which the pleadings are cast and
that the plaintiff may shift his ground, within the liberal rules of
amendment referred to above, at least until the trial and judgment. 78
'74Among other cases, see Ireland v. Waymire, 107 Kan. 384, x91 Pac.
304 (criticized in 30 YALX L. J. 206) ; Belding v. Whittington, 154 Ark. 56r,
243 S. W. 8o8; Van Scherpe v. Ulberg, 232 Mich. 699, 206 N. W. 323 (1926),
crit. 39 HARv. L. Rv. 722; Maturi v. Fay (N. J. 7925), 129 Atl. 185, rev'g 96
N. J. Eq. 472, 126 Atl. 17o; Rose v. Buckley (N. J. 1925), 13o Atl. 527. See
also United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 26o U. S. 290, 43 Sup. Ct. 1OO,
criticized 23 CoL. L. R-v. 380, 36 HARv. L. Rzv. 592, 17 ILL. L. REv. 614, 7
M xN. L. Rev. 244, 71 U. OF PA. L. RIev. 178. Cf. Terry v. Munger, 121 N.
Y. 161, 24 N. E. 272, with later New York cases, note 173, supra.
175Fast v. Judy (Ind. 1925), 147 N. E. 728; Sauer v. Bradley, 87 Okla.
277, 210 Pac. 726; Tracy v. Aldrich (Mo. 1921), 250 S. W. 381; Morlon v.
Lucey Mfg. Corp., 7 F. (2d) 494; Abbadessa v. Puglisi, IO Conn. I, i24
At. 838. See also authorities cited in note 164, supra; Clarke, J., in Fried-
richsen v. Renard, 247 U. S. 207, 277, 38 Sup. Ct. 45o. This should clearly
be so where the first remedy sought is non-existent; authorities supra;
Schenck v. State Line Tel. Co., note 173, supra; but see United States v.
Oregon Lumber Co., note 174, supra.
176For references to the rules as to amendments, see note 116, supra. Of
course the states vary as to the freedom with which they permit amendment,
though the tendency is to ever greater liberality. Cf. Y. B. Smith. note 116.
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Thereafter he will probably be forced in most cases, under the rules
of res judicata, to proceed only upon the unsatisfied judgment,1 7 7
but he should be at liberty to pursue the defendant in some manner
until satisfaction. The doctrine that the form in which suit is in-
stituted constitutes an irrevocable election operates to penalize a
litigant-in favor of a wrongdoer-for merely choosing a wrong
strategy of attack in his complaint. This may have been the sporting
concept of common law pleading, but it is not, or at least, should
not be, the theory of modern pleading.1 7 8
supra; 32 YALU L. J. 5o6; 21 COL. L. Rzv. 289. "It is apparent that the meas-
ure of consistency required of a litigant in any jurisdiction must depend a good
deal on the character of its rules of procedure." Beach, J., in Abbadessa v.
Puglisi, note 175, supra.
177See note 166, supra, and compare the English rule, note 168, .supra;
also the discussions of Hahl v. Sugo, 169 N. Y. lO9, 62 N. E. 135, referred
to in note 117, supra. As to pursuing "co-existing and consistent" remedies,
see Standard Sewing Machine Co. v. Owings, 14o N. C. 503, 53 S. E. 345; cf.
Sibert v. McAvoy, 15 Ill. io6; Steinbach v. Relief Fire Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 498.78"The doctrine of election is inherited from the inexorable logic of the
formulary system of the common law. Modern procedure, more or less
libellary in character, sacrifices consistency so far as is necessary to the at-
tainment of substantial justice." Beach, J., in Abbadessa v. Puglisi, note
175, supra. For criticism of the analogous doctrine of "the theory of a
pleading," see the writer's article, "The Complaint in Code Pleading," 35
YALZ L. J. 259, 280-285.
